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THE NORMATIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT  
 
 
Matthew Tokson† 
 
For decades, courts have used a “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
standard to determine whether a government action is a Fourth Amendment 
search.  Scholars have convincingly argued that this test is incoherent, arbitrary, 
and incapable of protecting privacy against modern forms of surveillance.  Yet 
few alternatives have been proposed, and those alternatives pose many of the same 
problems as the current standard.   
This Article offers a new theoretical approach for determining the scope of 
the Fourth Amendment.  It develops a normative model of Fourth Amendment 
searches, one that explicitly addresses the balance between law enforcement 
effectiveness and citizens’ interests inherent in Fourth Amendment law.  
Drawing on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and contextual privacy theory, 
it emphasizes surveillance’s concrete impacts, including its deterrence of lawful 
activities, interference with relationships and communications, and measurable 
psychological harms.  The normative model’s pragmatic focus allows it to capture 
the fundamental harms and benefits of surveillance while remaining workable for 
courts. 
The normative approach is consistent with the language, history, and 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and its values are echoed throughout the 
relevant caselaw.  It also has important practical advantages over current 
doctrine: it is adaptable to technological change, encompasses non-privacy harms 
such as coercion and discrimination, reflects Fourth Amendment values more 
fully than other approaches, promotes judicial transparency, and is better able to 
address large-scale surveillance programs.  Further, the normative approach can 
help resolve a variety of difficult Fourth Amendment questions involving emails, 
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internet browsing, smart home technology, financial records, household trash, 
and more.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of a Fourth Amendment “search” is important to both 
law enforcement officers and the citizens they may surveil.  The 
Amendment classically requires officers to obtain a warrant before 
engaging in a search, and even the exceptions to this rule typically 
demand probable cause.  By contrast, when an investigative practice is 
not a search, the government can use it to investigate any citizen without 
meaningful constitutional regulation.1    
Yet the definition of a “search” has changed dramatically over time 
and remains contested today.  Currently, searches are largely defined by 
the Katz test, which looks to whether a person had a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” in the thing searched.2  This expectations-based 
test expanded the scope of the Fourth Amendment beyond physical 
things and solved the problem of rampant government wiretapping in 
the mid-20th century.  But it has given rise to a host of new problems and 
become one of the most widely disparaged tests in all of American law.3  
The test is tautological,4 incoherent,5 ignores important Fourth 
                                                 
1 For example, the government lawfully gathered millions of citizens’ dialed 
phone numbers following Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979), which 
held that obtaining such information was not a search.   
2 E.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986).  Investigations involving the 
physical touching of property for information-gathering purposes typically 
require a warrant under a new and evolving sub-rule.  See Florida v. Jardines, 
569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06 (2012).  
3 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth 
Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s 
Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1771 (1994); Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the 
Constitution: The Supreme Court, Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. 
L.J. 5, 28-29 (2002); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in 
Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 121 
(2002); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 103 (2008); 
Amitai Etzioni, Eight Nails into Katz’s Coffin, 65 CASE W. L. REV. 413 (2014).  
4 William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth 
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1824–25 (2016). 
5 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511 
(2010). 
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Amendment values,6 gives judges free reign to impose their policy 
preferences,7  and as a practical matter is notoriously unhelpful.8  It has 
failed to protect privacy in many digital forms of information,9 will shrink 
the Fourth Amendment’s scope as knowledge of privacy threats 
increases,10 and is increasingly useless in the Internet age.11  These 
problems stem from a core deficiency: societal expectations are difficult 
to assess and offer a shaky foundation for the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections.  Katz, in short, is poorly suited to regulating government 
surveillance in the modern world.  The Supreme Court itself has begun 
to recognize the deficiencies of the current regime, holding in Carpenter v. 
United States that the Fourth Amendment protects against cell phone 
location tracking despite the fact that cell phone location data is not 
“private” and is exposed to third-party companies.12  As the Court starts 
to move beyond the strictures of the Katz test, the time is right to rethink 
how the Fourth Amendment applies to modern surveillance practices. 
But while critiques of the Katz test are legion, concrete alternatives 
are rare.  There is a growing recognition that the question of the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope is inescapably normative—that it requires courts to 
make a value judgment about when the Fourth Amendment should 
protect citizens’ privacy, rather than simply determining whether citizens 
generally expect privacy.13  A number of scholars have accordingly 
                                                 
6 William Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 1016, 1021 (1995).  
7 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
8 Carter, 525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Solove, supra note 5, at 1522–
24.  
9 E.g., Etzioni, supra note 3, at 421–22; Colb, supra note 3, at 132–39. 
10 Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. 
REV. 139, 187 (2016). 
11 Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L. J. 
1309, 1325–26 (2012). 
12 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).  
13 Note that the terms “citizens” or “people” used below encompass resident 
aliens, although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled that the Fourth 
Amendment applies to such persons.  Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 
494 US 259, 271 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
nonresident aliens but noting that similar protections apply to residents); INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (assuming without deciding that 
the Fourth Amendment applied to an undocumented immigrant present in the 
United States). 
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argued that courts should take a more normative approach to the Fourth 
Amendment.14  But little progress has been made towards developing an 
actual normative test, beyond simply calling for courts to create one.15   
This Article takes a different approach.  It develops a specific, 
detailed normative model for determining the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The model is grounded in contextual theories of 
surveillance, which focus on the specific activities and communications 
that surveillance disrupts.  It draws on Fourth Amendment precedents 
that reflect many of the same concerns, which are sometimes lost in the 
futile search for societal expectations.  And it addresses a literature that 
has received relatively little attention in Fourth Amendment scholarship, 
encompassing numerous studies of the measurable harms of surveillance 
to its targets.16 
Drawing on these sources, the normative model breaks out 
surveillance harms into three categories: avoidance of activities because 
of fear of surveillance; harm to relationships and communications; and 
direct psychological or physical harm.  These harms are measurable and 
often well-documented.17  Yet they are also easier for judges to intuit in 
difficult cases than concepts like societal knowledge or expectations.18   
On the other side of the balance are the benefits of crime detection 
and prevention.  This inquiry would consider, for instance, whether a 
surveillance technique would primarily be used in the early stages of an 
investigation in order to build probable cause, and whether it would be 
likely to reveal criminal activity that would otherwise be impossible to 
detect.19  A normative test would also examine whether the same 
information might be obtained through less invasive means.20  
Considering these factors, if a surveillance practice causes harms to 
individuals that outweigh the benefits from enhanced law enforcement, 
courts should hold that the Fourth Amendment requires the police to 
obtain a warrant (or satisfy an exception to the warrant requirement) 
before conducting the surveillance.   
                                                 
14 See infra Part I.A. 
15 See id. 
16 See infra Part I.C.2.c. 
17 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 113–118. 
18 See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 82. 
19 See infra Part I.C.1. 
20 See infra Part I.C.3. 
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The goal of the proposal is to move past mere critique of the Katz test 
and towards formulating a workable replacement, one that is better able 
to address the ever-changing landscape of modern surveillance.  Like any 
legal regime, the normative model is hardly perfect, and potential 
objections to it are addressed in detail below.21  But there are numerous 
theoretical and practical reasons to favor a normative approach.  A 
normative balancing test reflects the values at the heart of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence more fully and effectively than other 
approaches.  It is likewise consistent with the text and history of the 
Fourth Amendment.22  Indeed, both the leading originalist interpretation 
of the Amendment and less formalist theories of construction support a 
balancing approach to the crucial question of when the government can 
engage in suspicionless surveillance.23   
The functional advantages of the normative test are substantial, and 
arguably essential for addressing modern surveillance practices.  The test 
is, for example, adaptable to new surveillance technologies and new 
social contexts.  It takes into account harms that other approaches ignore, 
including coercion and discrimination.  It is far better suited to 
addressing programmatic surveillance and data analysis.  And it directly 
considers the normative values at stake in Fourth Amendment cases, 
avoiding the false targets and arbitrariness of alternative tests.24   
Moreover, the test can be usefully applied to a variety of Fourth 
Amendment questions that courts and scholars struggle with under 
current law.  It can offer clear answers in frontier cases such as those 
involving internet browsing data, smart home technology, or email 
content.  The normative approach can also help rehabilitate some widely 
criticized cases that have plausible outcomes but dubious reasoning.  
Finally, the test can help identify flawed cases that are ripe for reversal, 
where the normative balance tilts sharply in favor of privacy or 
surveillance but current law leads courts to the opposite outcome.   
The Article proceeds in five Parts.  Part I describes the normative 
model in detail and traces its lineage in Fourth Amendment precedent 
and surveillance theory.  Part II discusses the textual, historical, and 
                                                 
21 See infra Part IV. 
22 See infra Part II. 
23 See infra Part II.B. 
24 Additional advantages are discussed infra at Part III. 
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theoretical foundations of a balancing approach to the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope.  Part III examines the many practical advantages of 
the normative approach.  Part IV addresses potential objections to the 
normative test and to balancing tests in general.  It also examines an 
alternative approach that looks to positive law as the basis for the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections.  Part V applies the normative model to resolve 
frontier cases, provide firmer support for poorly reasoned cases, and 
identify deeply flawed cases suitable for reversal.  
 
I. TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT  
 
A. The Katz Test and the Need for Normativity 
 
The Supreme Court has established that a Fourth Amendment search 
occurs when a government act violates an individual’s “reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”25  This standard derives from Justice Harlan’s 
solo concurrence in the 1967 case Katz v. United States.26   
                                                 
25 E.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).  The Supreme Court has 
recently adopted a sub-test that finds a Fourth Amendment search when a 
government official physically intrudes on property for the purposes of 
gathering information.  See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013); United 
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06 (2012).  This has, thus far, added little to the 
Katz test, and the Supreme Court cases where it has been employed would 
likely have reached the same outcome under Katz.  Jardines, 569 U.S. at 12–16 
(Kagan, J., concurring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  It has also rapidly become confusing and difficult to apply, as the 
Court has had to determine the extent of an implied social license to enter the 
curtilage of a home—a question bound up in a social norms inquiry even more 
amorphous and confusing than the Katz test.  Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10; George M. 
Dery III, Failing to Keep “Easy Cases Easy”: Florida v. Jardines Refuses to Reconcile 
Inconsistencies in Fourth Amendment Privacy Law by Instead Focusing on Physical 
Trespass, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 471–79 (2014).  
26 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  This approach was quickly 
adopted by lower courts and the Supreme Court as the definitive test.  E.g., 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“We have recently held that . . . wherever an 
individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be 
free from unreasonable government intrusion.”) (quoting Katz 389 U.S. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring)); United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 878 
(9th Cir. 1970) (considering whether defendant had a “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” when crossing the border from Mexico to California).  
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Criticism of the test began not long after its adoption and has only 
grown in volume and intensity over the years.27  Critics argue that a test 
based on expectations is unworkable and tautological.28  They note the 
potential for circularity, as societal expectations about privacy may be 
shaped by government practices and judicial decisions.29  They point out 
that courts are poorly situated to assess societal views about privacy.30  
Moreover, an expectations-based Fourth Amendment will shrink over 
time as knowledge of privacy threats increases.31   
For decades, and increasingly often in recent years, scholars have 
called upon courts to take a more normative approach.32  Such an 
approach would focus on the level of privacy that citizens should have 
rather than how much privacy they expect.33   
Calls for a normative approach to the Fourth Amendment sometimes 
follow broad critiques of the Katz test,34 but they also arise in narrower 
works examining new surveillance technologies.35  These analyses are 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Perplexing Questions about Three Basic Fourth 
Amendment Issues: Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause, and the Warrant 
Requirement, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 425, 429 (1969); sources cited supra 
note 4. 
28 Baude & Stern, supra note 4, at 1824–25. 
29 E.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 132−33 
30 Daniel J. Solove, supra note 5, at 1521−22. 
31 E.g., Tokson, supra note 10, at 187.   
32 See, e.g., Neil Richards, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Future of the Cloud, 94 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1441, 1487−88 (2018); Olivier Sylvain, Failing Expectations: 
Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Era of Total Surveillance, 49 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 485, 522 (2014); Justin Holbrook, Communications Privacy in the Military, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 831, 903 (2010); Catherine Hancock, Warrants for Wearing A 
Wire: Fourth Amendment Privacy and Justice Harlan's Dissent in United States v. 
White, 79 MISS. L.J. 35, 36−38 (2009); Gavin Skok, Establishing A Legitimate 
Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream Data, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 
82–83 (2000); James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an 
Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 
698 (1985).   
33 E.g., Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is Made 
of?, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 781, 795 (2008) (“At some level the constitutional 
inquiry must concern not just what society actually believes is private, but what 
we ought to be able to regard as private.”). 
34 See, e.g., Tomkovicz, supra note 32, at 698. 
35 See, e.g., Skok, supra note 32, at 82−83.  Justice Harlan himself called for a 
more normative approach, repudiating in part the Katz test that he had created, 
in a case involving an undercover government agent’s recording of a 
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generally insightful.  Yet these divergent writings share a profound 
humility regarding the content of a normative test.  They sometimes note 
“[t]he difficulty [in] determining the right normative formula,”36 or 
clarify that the general normative approach they favor is “fact-driven” 
and imprecise,37 or explain that “[in] this initial effort it would be futile to 
attempt to provide closure on the subject of possible grounds” for a 
normative test.38  More commonly, they simply urge courts to take a 
normative approach and reach the correct results in various cases, 
without explaining what such an approach would entail.39  A few 
scholars have taken a descriptive approach, examining federal and state 
post-Katz cases and identifying things that seem to correlate with Fourth 
Amendment violations (such as intrusiveness) or that are generally 
relevant to privacy (such as the nature of the information sought).40  But 
these correlates have not yielded a test, except perhaps a “totality of the 
circumstances” test that directs courts to weigh any relevant normative 
considerations and reach the best outcome.41   
                                                 
conversation.  United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 768 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting).  
36 Gruber, supra note 33, at 838. 
37 Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy for Youth in A Digital Age, 
80 MISS. L.J. 1035, 1091 (2011). 
38 Tomkovicz, supra note 32, at 703. 
39 See, e.g., Sylvain, supra note 32, at 522; Skok, supra note 32, at 82−83. 
40 Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 3, ¶¶ 64–66 (discussing intrusive searches);  Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond 
the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, 
and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 985–1014 (2007) (listing 
considerations relevant to privacy); Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the 
Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically 
Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 722–23 (1988) (discussing 
generalities relevant to privacy). 
41  Henderson, supra note 15, at 985–1014, 1026 (noting several nondispositive 
considerations relevant to privacy and affirming the importance of a “totality of 
the circumstances” approach to the Fourth Amendment).  Paul Ohm has 
described Carpenter v. United States as radically changing the Katz test itself and 
virtually replacing it with the standard for cell phone data set out in Carpenter, 
which looks to the “the deeply revealing nature of [cell phone data], its depth, 
breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature 
of its collection,” as well as the increased efficiency of collecting cell phone 
location information.  See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2223, 2218; 
Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, HARV. J. L. & TECH. __  (2019), 
manuscript at 7−8.  Even assuming that this standard is now controlling in the 
 DRAFT - Forthcoming, 104 Minnesota L. Rev. (2019) 
8 
 
What explains the reluctance to specify how courts should 
normatively determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment?  One of the 
earliest and most illuminating calls for a normative approach, from James 
Tomkovicz’s 1985 Article, suggests that the difficulty of formulating a 
normative test stems in part from the difficulty of conceptualizing the 
harms that government surveillance can cause.42  Tomkovicz offers no 
test and notes that there are “no ready guides” for value judgments 
regarding citizens’ privacy, but posits that as theories of privacy and 
related constitutional values develop, courts could incorporate their 
conclusions into a normative approach.43   
Several decades later, the time has come to incorporate the insights 
of privacy and surveillance theory into a concrete Fourth Amendment 
test.  Such theory has made enormous progress over the past thirty years 
and in a variety of fields, including law, sociology, philosophy, and 
information science.  Among other developments, privacy theory has 
largely shifted from identifying abstract principles of privacy towards 
focusing on the specific practices, communications, and freedoms that 
privacy enables.   
Scholars have offered various general theories of privacy, including 
privacy as control over information,44 limited exposure to others,45 
                                                 
third party doctrine context, it is unlikely that the Court intended it to modify 
Katz.  Indeed, the Court took pains to avoid providing any guidance on future 
Fourth Amendment issues, emphasizing that “[o]ur opinion today is a narrow 
one” and listing several Fourth Amendment issues (including those closely 
related to historical cell phone data) on which the Court expressed no opinion.  
See Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. 2220.  Still, Ohm’s point is well taken that Carpenter 
might serve as a basis for a rethinking of the Katz test.  See Ohm, manuscript at 
7−8.  I have elsewhere argued that the Carpenter and United States v. Jones 
opinions reflect the Court’s recognition of factors that have long dictated its 
application of Katz.  Tokson, manuscript at 2.  
42 Tomkovicz, supra note 32, at 701−02. 
43 Id. at 702−03.   
44 E.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 
YALE L.J. 475 (1968). 
45 E.g., SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 
(1983); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980). 
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intimacy,46 bodily integrity,47 and as a precondition to self-development.48  
Yet theorists have increasingly recognized that the meaning of privacy is 
rarely fixed or universal, and that its value often depends on the social 
contexts in which it can protect individuals from coercion, condemnation, 
and other harms.49  As social practices and norms change, different 
aspects of privacy can become more or less important.  For instance, 
control over data may be increasingly important in the Internet era, while 
limiting exposure to others may be less of a concern in an age of larger 
houses and increasing social isolation.  Moreover, some aspects of 
privacy may be crucial in some contexts and irrelevant in others.   
In order to develop a more complete account of privacy harm, 
theories of contextual privacy have looked to the norms that govern 
information exchange in a wide variety of social contexts and 
relationships.50  When people offer their information in a certain context, 
the exchange of information is generally governed by implicit agreements 
regarding its use.51  These agreements and norms might dictate, for 
instance, that the parties restrict further information flow or maintain 
anonymity by declining to link the data with personally identifiable 
information.52  Violations of these context-dependent norms lead to 
identifiable harms, as parties’ preferences are ignored and their interests 
adversely affected.53  Thus a clinical worker who disclosed a patient’s 
treatment for addiction would violate norms of behavior specific to the 
treatment context, causing harms to the patient’s reputation, 
psychological well-being, employment prospects, etc. 
                                                 
46 E.g., JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION (1992); Tom Gerety, 
Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 268 (1977).  
47 E.g., Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 283–84 
(1974).  
48 E.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as 
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 723 (1999); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 
52 Vand. L. Rev. 1609 (1999).  
49 See, e.g., HELEN FAY NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, 
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 80−89 (2010); Adam D. Barth, et al., Privacy 
and Contextual Integrity: Framework and Applications, 2006 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 184 (May 2006).   
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 125. 
52 See id. at 186–87. 
53 See id. at 212. 
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Relatedly, pragmatic privacy theories focus on how the lack of 
privacy deters and interrupts specific social and personal practices.54  
They posit that the value of privacy depends on the practices that it 
protects, which include activities as varied as political activism, 
shopping, communication, research, nudity, and intimacy.55  Likewise, 
the concept of intellectual privacy has called attention to the importance 
of privacy to expressive activities, personal communications, and 
freedom of thought itself.56  It reveals a particularly important set of 
practices and cognition that surveillance has the potential to disrupt.  
These and other recent theoretical movements offer a deeper, more 
specific, and more practical understanding of the harms of surveillance.  
Their insights can help provide a foundation for a workable normative 
approach to the Fourth Amendment.   
This Article’s analysis of the harms of government surveillance can, 
in turn, help to further develop and refine contextual and pragmatic 
privacy theories.  The Article examines in detail a particularly important 
privacy context: surveillance by police or other government officials of 
private citizens.  It identifies the most fundamental disruptions and 
harms caused by such surveillance.  More broadly, the Article develops 
an analytical approach that can be used to evaluate private intrusions and 
government surveillance alike.   
The following sections propose a concrete, normative test for the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope and trace the lineage of each factor of the test 
in surveillance theory, constitutional practice, or both.  Part II then 
discusses the test’s doctrinal, historical, and theoretical foundations. 
 
B. A Normative Test 
 
An effective normative test for the Fourth Amendment’s scope 
would balance the benefits of warrantless government surveillance 
against its costs.  However, a test that merely directs courts to weigh all 
benefits to law enforcement against all harms to citizens is not sufficiently 
detailed or rigorous.  Such a standard would require each individual 
                                                 
54 See Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1126−32 
(2002). 
55 Id. at 1143, 1146−54. 
56 See Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 412−26 (2008). 
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court to determine how best to theorize and assess the various harms of 
surveillance, likely resulting in extreme inconsistency and prohibitively 
high decision costs.  
Courts require a more concrete, workable test.  But, if it is to reflect 
the normative balance inherent in the Fourth Amendment, such a test 
must also incorporate essential categories of law enforcement benefit and 
social harm.  The following proposal attempts to fulfill these goals and 
strike a middle ground between including important categories of 
surveillance harm and remaining concise.  Its aim is not only to offer a 
workable test, but to shift the focus of Fourth Amendment debate from 
the general need for a normative approach to what such an approach 
should look like.   
The normative test asks whether a surveillance practice’s value to 
law enforcement in terms of crime detection and prevention outweighs 
three fundamental harms: the avoidance of lawful activity because of fear 
of surveillance; the harm to relationships and communications caused by 
observation; and the concrete psychological or physical harm suffered 
due to surveillance.  The test then asks whether the same law enforcement 
goals could be achieved via a less invasive practice.  If, considering these 
factors, the total harm to citizens from a type of surveillance outweighs 
the total benefit from enhanced law enforcement, courts should hold that 
the Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant (or to satisfy 
an exception to the warrant requirement) before conducting the 
surveillance.  If the benefit to law enforcement outweighs the harm, then 
the police should be able to conduct the surveillance without Fourth 
Amendment regulation. 
These three categories of harm are derived not only from basic 
Fourth Amendment ideals like privacy, liberty, and security, but also a 
consideration of the functional and practical values these ideals protect.57  
                                                 
57 For a discussion of historical Fourth Amendment ideals, see, e.g., Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“It is not the breaking of [a man’s] 
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the 
offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, 
personal liberty, and private property.”); Morgan Cloud, Searching through 
History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1726 (1996) (“[T]he 
historical record suggests that objections to general warrants and general 
searches alike rested upon broad concerns about protecting privacy, property, 
and liberty from unwarranted and unlimited intrusions.”).  
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The Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent arbitrary government 
surveillance,58 a valuable goal not only in itself but also because such 
surveillance prevents us from acting freely, stifles our relationships and 
free association, and does harm to us both as individuals and as citizens 
of a democracy.  These practical values are embodied in the proposed 
test.  Each of the factors has a basis in existing Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, well-developed theories of privacy and police coercion, or 
both.  The following sections discuss the factors in more detail and 
discuss their doctrinal and theoretical foundations.   
 
C. The Factors in Depth 
 
1. Crime Detection and Prevention 
 
The first factor of the test examines a warrantless surveillance 
practice’s benefits to law enforcement, which can primarily be expressed 
in terms of enhanced crime detection and enhanced deterrence.59  Because 
detection and prevention are generally linked, the test combines them in 
a single inquiry.60   
This factor essentially asks, how valuable to law enforcement would 
it be to be able to engage in a certain type of warrantless surveillance?  A 
court might consider whether a surveillance technique would primarily 
be used in the early stages of investigations, before probable cause has 
been developed, and whether the warrantless use of the technique would 
be likely to reveal criminal activity that would otherwise go undetected.61  
                                                 
58 E.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 547, 744−45. (1999).   
59 It would also encompass evidence collection for the purposes of conviction, 
which would have benefits related to detection, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
retribution.    
60 See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and 
Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 
39 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 883–84 (2001) (Studying drinking and driving trends 
among college students and finding that the certainty of punishment was a 
stronger deterrent than the severity of punishment).  Courts might optionally 
prefer to analyze these facts of law enforcement separately, breaking this factor 
out into two separate factors on the law enforcement side of the balance. 
61 Courts could also consider relevant studies examining the effects of limiting 
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For example, if obtaining certain financial records without a warrant 
would allow police to identify white collar crimes that would otherwise 
be difficult to detect, that would weigh in favor of excluding such records 
from Fourth Amendment regulation.62  Relatedly, courts could consider 
studies examining the effects of limiting a particular surveillance 
technique.  Research indicating that limits on certain kinds of surveillance 
would reduce police ability to build probable cause63 or to deter certain 
crimes64 may help to quantify the value of the surveillance to law 
enforcement goals.  Reports issued by agencies tasked with independent 
evaluation, such as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, may 
also be helpful in assessing law enforcement efficacy.65   
The consideration of law enforcement effectiveness is grounded in 
Fourth Amendment caselaw, although courts’ treatment of it has been 
haphazard and unstructured.  The Supreme Court has explicitly 
                                                 
various surveillance techniques. One recent study, for instance, found that 
subjecting telephone call logs to a warrant requirement resulted in fewer 
applications for wiretaps and a decrease in the duration of permitted wiretaps. 
Anne E. Boustead, POLICE, PROCESS, AND PRIVACY: THREE ESSAYS ON THE THIRD 
PARTY DOCTRINE, 18–20 (2016), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD384.html.  Its findings 
suggest that regulating the acquisition of call log data reduces police officers’ 
ability to obtain sufficient probable cause for Wiretap Act applications. Id. 
62 See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 509 (2011) (explaining that the Supreme Court 
eliminated the warrant requirement for financial records following the rise of 
difficult-to-detect white-collar crimes); see also David Gray, Danielle Keats 
Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart, Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 
103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745, 777–78, 798 (2013) (discussing types of 
digital evidence that are especially helpful in detecting healthcare fraud and 
cyberharassment). 
63 Boustead, supra note 61, at 18−20. 
64 See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, What Caused the 2016 Chicago Homicide 
Spike? An Empirical Examination of the ‘ACLU Effect’ and the Role of Stop and Frisks 
in Preventing Gun Violence, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 63) (noting an increase in gun violence in the year following the 
cessation of programmatic stop-and-frisk searches in Chicago); Gary T. Marx, 
Seeing Hazily (But Not Darkly) Through the Lens: Some Recent Empirical Studies of 
Surveillance Technologies, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 339, 349 (2005) (discussing the 
deterrent effects of video monitoring in interrogation rooms on violence by 
both detainees and the police). 
65 See Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 
STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1119−21 (2016). 
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considered benefits to law enforcement in cases concerning the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope,66 and such benefits implicitly justify the results in 
countless other scope cases.67  This consideration also helps determine the 
effective scope of the Amendment by shaping and limiting its remedies.68 
At the level of theory, some concern for effective law enforcement is 
inherent in the existence of criminal laws.  The theoretical justifications 
for criminal law enforcement are largely identical to those that justify 
criminal laws and punishments—the utilitarian benefits of deterrence, 
public safety, and rehabilitation;69 the deontological values of justice and 
retribution;70 or a pragmatic mixture of both.71  Any normative balancing 
                                                 
66 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984) (discussing the importance 
of detecting inmate crimes in a prison setting); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 442–43(1976) (noting the “high degree of usefulness in criminal tax, and 
regulatory investigations and proceedings” of bank records); Arizona v. Gant, 
556 U.S. 332, 344, 347 (2009) (mentioning the evidentiary interests of the police 
as a justification for broadening the scope of the vehicular search incident to 
arrest doctrine).  
67 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90−91 (1998) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to temporary house guests who are not 
personal friends of the homeowner, in a case involving a drug sale); California 
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (concluding that police officers are 
entitled to view a house’s curtilage from any place where citizens can lawfully 
go, including airspace); see also United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 439−41 
(9th Cir. 2016) (holding that no warrant is required to collect a U.S. citizen’s 
emails to a foreign national, in a case involving allegations of terrorism). 
68 For example, the “good-faith exception” cases limit the application of the 
exclusionary rule in large part because of the rule’s detrimental effects on law 
enforcement and criminal deterrence.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & 
Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364−65 (1998) (“[T]he exclusionary rule … allows 
many who would otherwise be incarcerated to escape the consequences of their 
actions … the rule’s costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement 
objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging application of the rule.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Courts grant qualified immunity to law 
enforcement officers for violations of the Fourth Amendment for similar 
reasons.  See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (justifying 
qualified immunity in part on concerns that a lack of immunity would deter 
law enforcement officers from performing their duties to the full extent). 
69 E.g., Joel Feinberg, The Classic Debate, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 727, 729 (Joel 
Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 2000). 
70 E.g., Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
815, 826–28 (2007). 
71 E.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Lifting the Veil on Punishment, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
443, 449–50 (2004). 
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approach to regulating law enforcement must take law enforcement 
effectiveness into account.   
 
2. Harms to Individuals  
 
As discussed above, a workable normative test must capture the 
most substantial harms caused by government surveillance and be 
sufficiently administrable that judges can effectively apply the test.72  
Contextual and pragmatic theories of surveillance point the way towards 
a test that can meet both needs.  They focus on the particular practices 
and relationships disrupted by surveillance.  This practical emphasis has 
several benefits.  First, it can unify various theories of privacy and other 
Fourth Amendment values like liberty and trust by emphasizing their 
shared practical concerns rather than their abstract theoretical 
differences.73  Second, the practical harms of surveillance are easier for 
judges to address than are esoteric theories of privacy or trust.   
The normative test proposed here combines a focus on disrupted 
practices and relationships with another category of fundamental harms: 
measurable psychological or physical harms suffered by the subjects of 
government investigations.  By incorporating these factors, the test can 
capture the primary harms to individuals from government surveillance 
without requiring judges to grapple with abstract theories or societal 
expectations.    
Although the test focuses on the pragmatic harms of surveillance, its 
focus is necessarily broad, addressing the surveillance technique used in 
the relevant case as a whole rather than in isolation.  It does so by 
hypothesizing that the surveillance technique has become widespread 
and well-known, and asking how people’s behavior would change as a 
result or how they would be directly harmed.  This comprehensive 
approach is necessary for several reasons.  First, a broad approach to the 
harms of surveillance is necessary to match the broad consideration of 
law enforcement benefits.  The Supreme Court frequently considers the 
general benefits of surveillance to law enforcement, benefits that go 
                                                 
72 See supra Part I.B. 
73 See generally Solove, supra note 54 (discussing the theoretical differences 
between the leading privacy theories). 
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beyond those realized in the instant case.74  Courts should likewise 
consider the widespread harms of surveillance when evaluating potential 
Fourth Amendment searches.  Second, predicting the exact future 
prevalence of a surveillance technique or determining the likely extent of 
societal knowledge would be very difficult, especially for courts 
addressing novel surveillance technologies.75  Finally, a broad assessment 
better aligns courts’ analyses with the potential consequences of their 
decisions.  Fourth Amendment cases nearly always have broad 
implications.  When a court rules that the police may dig through one 
defendant’s trash bags without a warrant, the police can thereafter dig 
through the trash bags of any person in the court’s jurisdiction.76  By 
assessing surveillance techniques as a whole, the normative test 
appropriately focuses courts’ attention on the actual impacts of their 
decisions. 
 
a) Deterring Lawful Activities 
 
The first harm factor asks whether a given type of surveillance would 
                                                 
74 See supra notes 66, 68. 
75 Tokson, supra note 10, at 164−79 (discussing the difficulties of measuring 
societal knowledge in even the most favorable circumstances).   
76  See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). Resource constraints may 
prevent police departments from engaging in costly surveillance on a grand 
scale. For lower-cost types of surveillance or for national security matters, 
however, the government might actually surveil most or all citizens.  Thus 
courts might safely assume that the use of a costly surveillance technique 
would be less widespread than that of a cheap technique, potentially affecting 
the extent of the harm caused.  For a detailed argument regarding surveillance 
costs and the importance of assessing surveillance technologies as a whole, see 
David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 62, 101−03 (2013).  
Further, courts applying a normative test would primarily focus on the 
domestic law enforcement context but could also consider the domestic anti-
terrorism context if doing so is helpful. By contrast, foreign intelligence 
surveillance may be exempt from the warrant requirement in any event, 
potentially making the question whether such surveillance is a “search” 
irrelevant. See generally United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913–
15 (4th Cir. 1980) (concluding that “the courts should not require the executive 
to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign intelligence surveillance,” but 
noting that those reasons do not justify warrantless domestic surveillance).   
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cause people to avoid lawful activities.  People engage in all manner of 
potentially sensitive, embarrassing, or controversial activities, like 
visiting a psychiatrist, researching sensitive subjects online, purchasing 
certain drugs or medical equipment, joining a substance-abuse support 
group, or criticizing government or social elites. These lawful activities 
can be deterred by the threat of surveillance.   For example, Google 
searches for terms deemed by user surveys as especially controversial or 
embarrassing decreased significantly following Edward Snowden’s 
disclosure of an NSA program capable of capturing internet 
information.77  Likewise, researchers documented a reduction in a wide 
variety of religious and social activities at New York mosques due to 
increased police surveillance after the September 11 attacks.78    
Courts may assess deterrence of lawful activities by using studies 
that show reduced activity following increased awareness of 
surveillance.79  Empirical studies on chilling effects have become 
increasingly common in recent years.80  Courts may also rely on expert 
                                                 
77 Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet 
Search Behavior (Feb. 17, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412564. Search terms 
studied included “abortion,” “gender reassignment,” “police brutality,” and 
“tax avoidance.” Id. at 49–50.  
78 Diala Shamas & Nermeen Arastu, Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and its 
Impact on American Muslims, Mar. 2013, at 12−15, available at 
http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/Mapping-
Muslims.pdf. 
79 See, e.g., Jonathan W. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia 
Use, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 146−57 (2016) (finding that views of Wikipedia 
articles on sensitive topics decreased significantly following the Snowden 
revelations); Marthews & Tucker, supra note 77.  See also Darhl M. Pedersen, 
Psychological Functions of Privacy, 17 J. ENV. PSYCH. 147. 150−52 (1997) 
(presenting survey results evaluating everyday activities that depend upon 
privacy); MIKE MCCAHILL, THE SURVEILLANCE WEB 145 (2002) (discussing the 
effects of video monitoring on the social behavior of mall security guards). 
80 See, e.g., Jonathon  Penney, Internet  Surveillance, Regulation, and Chilling  
Effects Online: A Comparative Case Study, 6 INTERNET POL’Y REV., May 26, 
2017, at 1, 3 (reporting survey evidence that government surveillance of the 
internet would reduce online speech, make speakers more guarded in terms of 
the content of their online speech, and chill online searching.); PEN America, 
Chilling Effects: NSA Surveillance Drives US Writers to Self-Censor, at 3 (Nov. 
12, 2013) (reporting that 28% of surveyed writers had curtailed social media 
activities out of concerns about surveillance, while 16% had avoided writing or 
speaking about certain subjects).  See generally JONATHON W. PENNEY, 
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witnesses or amicus briefs from professional associations noting the 
activities that a type of surveillance may discourage, as the Supreme 
Court did in Ferguson v. City of Charleston.81  
Moreover, judges are likely to be able to assess deterrence of lawful 
activities even in situations where there are no directly relevant studies.  
Whether surveillance would deter a person from engaging in lawful 
activities is a question that judges can fruitfully address through 
reasoning and intuition—if I were being surveilled by government agents 
using the technique at issue in this case, would I be likely to forego certain 
activities?  For example, a judge assessing long-term video monitoring by 
drones might recognize that she would likely curtail her activities in 
public and in the back yard of her home because of the monitoring, and 
this likely reduction in lawful activity would weigh in favor of requiring 
a warrant for long-term drone surveillance.  Judges are likely to be more 
successful in forming intuitions about how their own activities would be 
impacted by surveillance than grappling with abstract theories of privacy 
or attempting to calculate societal expectations.82 
Judicial intuitions are, of course, not infallible and are subject to 
                                                 
CHILLING EFFECTS: UNDERSTANDING  THE IMPACT   OF 
SURVEILLANCE  AND OTHER DIGITAL THREATS (forthcoming  2020).  
81 532 U.S. 67, 84 n.23 (2001) (noting that the American Medical Association and 
other groups filing amicus briefs agreed that drug testing of pregnant patients’ 
urine would deter women who use drugs from seeking prenatal care.) 
82 One might object that judges applying the Katz test can already use personal 
intuitions about whether they would expect privacy.  Aside from the myriad 
problems with using anyone’s expectations as a barometer for Fourth 
Amendment protection, see supra note 3, judicial intuition regarding privacy 
expectations is likely to be systematically biased against privacy interests.  
Expectations of privacy are inextricably linked to knowledge regarding 
surveillance and privacy threats.  See Tokson, supra note 10, at 149–50.  Judges 
will generally have unusually high levels of knowledge regarding the 
surveillance technique at issue—the parties will have informed them at length 
about the technology in their pleadings and briefs.  Thus they may expect less 
privacy in a given context than the vast majority of people.  Further, judges’ 
acquired knowledge is likely to bias their intuitive judgments about societal 
knowledge in general. Individuals tend to automatically and irrationally 
impute their own knowledge to other people, even when those people are 
extremely unlikely to know it.  See Boaz Keysar et al., States of Affairs and States 
of Mind: The Effect of Knowledge of Beliefs, 64 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 283, 284 (1995).   
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inaccuracy and bias.83  Social science studies provide more objective 
evidence but are likewise imperfect and prone to misinterpretation.84  
This Article does not argue that judges will employ either source of 
information perfectly.  It does contend that judicial intuition is better 
suited for assessing surveillance’s dampening effects on activities and 
relationships than for intuiting the state of societal expectations of 
privacy.85  Moreover, there is an extensive social science literature on 
surveillance harms that can aid judges in their assessments.86    
Courts are likely to be able to evaluate surveillance’s potential impact 
on lawful activities—indeed, they have already done so in several cases.  
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Court examined whether police searches 
of newspaper offices would interfere with the newspaper’s operations, 
dissuade confidential sources from coming forward, motivate editors to 
suppress controversial news stories, or “intrude into or to deter normal 
editorial and publication decisions.”87  Likewise, in cases involving 
searches and seizures of expressive materials, the Court has emphasized 
the need for the rigorous application of Fourth Amendment protections 
to prevent the stifling of legitimate book distribution or movie displays.88  
                                                 
83 Tokson, supra note 10, at 172−73. 
84 J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of A Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme 
Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 145 (1990). 
85 See supra note 82. 
86 There is a smaller but growing collection of surveys about surveillance and 
privacy expectations that can assist judges in assessing such expectations under 
Katz.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Empirical Fourth Amendment Scholars in 
Support of Petitioner at 4–10, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018) 
(No. 16-402), 2018 WL 3073916 (discussing studies that ask respondents about 
their expectations of privacy).  Courts have thus far been reluctant to employ 
such data, and people’s reported expectations may not match their behavior or 
may be more aspirational than actual.  See Tokson, supra note 10, at 180.  
Nonetheless, the use of empirical studies of societal expectations and 
knowledge would likely improve the accuracy of courts’ decisions under the 
Katz test.  Id.  However, the many conceptual flaws of the Katz test itself 
recommend abandoning the test even if courts were able to adjudicate it 
perfectly.  See, e.g., id. at 181−87.     
87 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978). 
88 See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504−05 (1973) (expressing 
concerns about police searches and seizures suppressing legitimate displays of 
movies); Quantity of Copies of Books v. State of Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 211 (1964) 
(holding that an overbroad warrant was unconstitutional in part because of its 
potential for deterring the publication of legitimate books).  Justice Sotomayor 
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Nor has this principle been limited to cases involving expressive 
activities.  In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme Court held that a 
public hospital’s program of drug testing pregnant women’s urine 
violated the Fourth Amendment, noting that medical professionals 
apparently agreed that such programs “discourag[ed] women who use 
drugs from seeking prenatal care.”89   
A concern with the deterrence of legitimate activities also has roots 
in pragmatic theories of privacy.  Pragmatic theories explicitly focus on 
concrete practices and conceive of privacy as a constitutive part of such 
practices.90  Accordingly, they define privacy harms in terms of 
disruptions to practices.91  In a similar vein, the theory of intellectual 
privacy emphasizes surveillance’s ability to chill activities of intellectual 
development and expression, from reading library books to web-surfing 
to writing and speaking.92  These theories provide a compelling account 
of the potential chilling effects of surveillance and the value of privacy-
dependent practices.  There are, however, other fundamental harms 
caused by government surveillance that a Fourth Amendment normative 
model must incorporate. 
 
b) Harm to Relationships 
 
The second harm factor asks whether a surveillance practice would 
interfere with or diminish interpersonal relationships.  Surveillance 
might harm such relationships by compromising intimate 
communications, deterring relationship formation, or diminishing the 
depth or quality of intimate relationships via the threat of observation. 
Relationships with others are both extremely important to people’s 
                                                 
recently expressed concern about the potential for surveillance to “chill[] … 
expressive freedoms.”  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
89 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84 n.23.  
90 Solove, supra note 54, at 1127−30. 
91 Id. at 1129.  An essential characteristic of a pragmatic theory is that it 
“focus[es] on the specific types of disruption and the specific practices 
disrupted rather than looking for the common [theoretical] denominator that 
links all of them.”  Id. at 1130. 
92 Richards, supra note 56, at 389, 421.   
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well-being and particularly dependent on privacy to flourish.93 An 
important aspect of personal relationships is “the sharing of information 
about one’s actions, beliefs or emotions which one does not share with 
all.”94  By protecting such personal information from general observation, 
“privacy creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship and 
love.”95  Surveillance can easily disrupt personal relationships by 
deterring unfettered communication,96 disrupting intimacy,97 inducing 
self-consciousness and self-censorship,98 or causing social embarrassment 
or condemnation.99 
 If a surveillance technique is likely to prevent people from 
expressing private, provocative, or intimate thoughts to each other, then 
that would weigh in favor of finding a Fourth Amendment search.  
Courts may assess a surveillance technique’s impacts on relationships by, 
for instance, examining studies showing that the technique decreases or 
diminishes personal communications.100  Judges can also usefully intuit 
the impact of outside surveillance on relationships.  The effects of 
observation by others on personal communications are generally easy to 
comprehend.  Virtually everyone has had the experience of moderating 
or ceasing a conversation due to potential overhearing by another such 
as a parent, teacher, stranger, or co-worker.    
The Supreme Court has not expressly analyzed interference with 
personal relationships in the Fourth Amendment context, but it has 
                                                 
93 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
919, 923–24 (2005).  
94 CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL 
CHOICE 142 (1970). 
95 Id. 
96 Richards, supra note 56, at 424. 
97 Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 268–69 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., 1984). 
98 Id. 
99 James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY, at 293−96 (1984); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as 
Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 138−39 (2004). 
100 See Carl Botan, Communication Work and Electronic Surveillance: A Model for 
Predicting Panoptic Effects, 63 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 293, 307, 309–10 (1996) 
(finding that workers under surveillance engaged in fewer personal 
communications); R.H. Irving, et al., Computerized Performance Monitoring 
Systems: Use and Abuse, 29 COMM. ACM 794, 799 (1986) (computer monitoring 
was correlated with a decrease in the quality of peer relationships). 
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repeatedly protected personal communications from government 
surveillance and emphasized the importance of unfettered discourse.  In 
the majority opinion in Katz, the Court subjected telephone conversations 
to a warrant requirement, grounding its holding in its recognition of “the 
vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private 
communication.”101  In one of the earliest Supreme Court Fourth 
Amendment cases, the Court declared that sealed letters could not be 
inspected without a search warrant.102  Recently, a Sixth Circuit case 
concluded that the Fourth Amendment should generally protect the 
contents of emails, lest it “prove an ineffective guardian of private 
communication, an essential purpose it has long been recognized to 
serve.”103  This essential purpose has been obscured to some degree by 
the confusions of the Katz test, but courts continue to protect personal 
communications even when current doctrine seems to suggest doing 
otherwise.104 
Outside of Fourth Amendment law, the Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of intimate relationships to human well-being 
and has vigorously protected these relationships from unnecessary state 
interference.105  Laws that might adversely affect marriages, parent-child 
relationships, non-marital romantic relationships, cohabitation, and 
others have been struck down as unconstitutional infringements on 
intimate relationships.106  The Court’s longstanding recognition of the 
importance of these relationships provides another basis for weighing 
                                                 
101 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
102 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877). 
103  Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United 
States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (recognizing the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection of “conversational privacy”)). 
104 See id. at 287 (refusing to create a bright-line rule protecting emails and 
noting that protecting emails is somewhat in tension with the reasoning of 
Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)). 
105 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (collecting cases).   
106 See, e.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 497−98 (1965) (marriage); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (parent-child); Carey v. Population 
Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684−86 (1977) (non-marital intimacy); Moore v. East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503−04 (1977) (plurality op.) (cohabitation); see also 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460−62 (1958) (striking 
down, on due process grounds, a law likely to deter citizens from associating 
with others for the purposes of advocacy). 
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harm to such relationships in a normative Fourth Amendment analysis. 
Intimacy and personal relationships have long been a central focus 
of privacy theory, and more recent developments in surveillance theory 
have specifically examined the potential for surveillance to disrupt 
relationships.  Scholars have explored intimacy as an important 
component of privacy since the 1970s,107 developing various accounts of 
the values of private relationships and the perniciousness of judgmental 
or exploitative observation.108  More recent, contextual theories of privacy 
have explored the disparate norms of information flow that govern the 
various relationships that we maintain.109  Surveillance can harm these 
associations not only when these norms are violated and information is 
spread too widely, but also when the fear of observation prevents the 
communication necessary to maintain these relationships.110  Intimacy, 
privacy, and communication are essential components of personal 
relationships, and our understanding of the roles they play has grown 
substantially in recent years. 
 
c) Psychological and Physical Injury 
 
The third factor asks whether people will suffer psychological or 
physical injury as a result of surveillance.  The impact of surveillance goes 
beyond the substantial effects it can have on people’s activities and 
relationships.  Even in the absence of such effects, the targets of 
surveillance can suffer personal harm from the observation, judgment, 
fear, and in some cases physical force associated with government 
investigations.    
Under this factor, evidence that a surveillance technique will likely 
cause stress, depression, or physical harm would weigh in favor of Fourth 
                                                 
107 Fried, supra note, at 142; Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 233, 268, 273 (1977). 
108 See, e.g., JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 57–58, 61–63 
(1992); Gerstein, supra note 97, at 267–69.  
109 Nissenbaum, supra note 99, at 138−39 (“Generally, these norms circumscribe 
the type or nature of information about various individuals that, within a given 
context, is allowable, expected, or even demanded to be revealed. In medical 
contexts, it is appropriate to share details of our physical condition . . . among 
friends we may pour over romantic entanglements . . ..”).  
110 See id. 
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Amendment protection.  The injuries captured here include not only 
violations of privacy but also a variety of other important harms, 
including discrimination, police coercion, and physical harm.111  In many 
cases, judges may be able to reason about or intuit such harms, for 
instance concluding that the constant visual monitoring of a subject will 
result in stress or that stop-and-frisk techniques will be associated with 
aggressive physical force.  There are, moreover, an increasing number of 
studies and reports that demonstrate measurable psychological and 
physical harms from surveillance.112   
The rich and growing social science literature on the personal harms 
of surveillance has been largely ignored in existing Fourth Amendment 
scholarship.  Yet it can provide a way for judges to concretize and 
measure internal privacy harms in a normative Fourth Amendment 
analysis.  For example, studies of computer keystroke or telephone 
monitoring and related practices have found a variety of psychological 
harms suffered by the targets of surveillance, including stress, anger, 
fatigue, depression, irritation, and infantilization.113  Researchers have 
also measured the physical and psychosomatic harms produced by 
surveillance, such as muscle pain and headaches.114  Studies of video 
monitoring show that subjects feel discomfort and agitation, as well as a 
feeling of being mistrusted.115  Research into stop-and-frisks and related 
police investigations demonstrate that a history of police contact is 
                                                 
111 See infra Part III.C. 
112 See infra notes 113−118 and accompanying text. 
113 See, e.g., Carl Botan & Mihaela Vorvoreanu, “What Are You Really Saying to 
Me?” Electronic Surveillance in the Workplace, CERIAS TECH REPORT, June 2000, at 
9–10, http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Botan_2000.pdf; Lawrence M. 
Schleifer, et al., Mood Disturbance and Musculoskeletal Discomfort Effects of 
Electronic Performance Monitoring in a VDT Data-Entry Task, at 195, in 
ORGANIZATIONAL RISK FACTORS FOR JOB STRESS (Steven L. Sauter & Lawrence R. 
Murphy, eds., 1995); M. J. Smith et al., Employee stress and health complaints in 
jobs with and without electronic performance monitoring, 23 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 
17, 21−22 (1992); Irving, supra note 100, at 799. 
114  E.g., Schleifer, et al., supra note 113, at 195; Smith et al., supra note 113, at 
21−22.  
115 Emmeline Taylor, I spy with my little eye: the use of CCTV in schools and the 
impact of privacy, 58 SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 381, 391−93 (2010); see also MIKE 
MCCAHILL, THE SURVEILLANCE WEB: THE RISE OF VISUAL SURVEILLANCE IN AN 
ENGLISH CITY 15–16 (2002) (discussing the discriminatory harms that CCTV 
facilitates). 
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correlated with higher anxiety and stress, while stop-and-frisk frequency 
and invasiveness is correlated with symptoms of PTSD.116  Studies of 
civilians subjected to consent searches of their vehicles reported 
persistent negative thoughts and attitudes about the encounter, and 
feelings of violation and bitterness.117  These reports can be augmented 
with the numerous studies in which respondents rate the perceived 
invasiveness of various surveillance practices including location tracking, 
social media monitoring, and internet data collection.118  Together, these 
studies constitute a detailed and wide-ranging account of the internal 
harms of surveillance.   
This is not to say that every surveillance technique found to cause 
stress or discomfort in a study should be considered a search.  Rather, 
these and similar studies can help to quantify the harms of surveillance 
and are accordingly relevant to the question of the Fourth Amendment’s 
scope.  The fact that a surveillance technique is linked to stress or pain is 
just one factor of several in the proposed normative test, and the relevant 
social science will rarely be definitive in any event.  Moreover, not every 
                                                 
116 Amanda Geller, et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young 
Urban Men, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2323−24 (2014); Abigail A. Sewell, et 
al., Living under surveillance: Gender, psychological distress, and stop-question-and-
frisk policing in New York City, 159 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1, 2, 6−7 (2016). 
117 Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of 
Coercion, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153, 212−13.  One responded noted that the police 
encounter produced “an empty feeling, like you’re nothing.”  Id. at 212.  
Another said, “I feel really violated … I feel really bitter about the whole thing.  
Id. 
118 Yongick Jeong & Erin Coyle, What are you Worrying About on Facebook and 
Twitter? An Empirical Investigation of Young Social Network Site Users’ Privacy 
Perceptions and Behaviors, 14 J. INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING 51, 55 (2014); Matthew 
Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 622–26 
(2011); Laurel A. McNall & Jeffrey M. Stanton, Private Eyes are Watching You: 
Reactions to Location Sensing Technologies, 26 J. Bus. Pscyh. 299, 304 (2011); 
Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 317, 335 (2008); TAMARA DINEV, ET AL., Internet privacy concerns and 
beliefs about government surveillance—An empirical investigation, 17 J. STRATEGIC 
INFO. SYS. 214, 223 (2008); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera 
Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L. J. 213, 275-76 
(2002); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at 
“Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 737−38, 
tbl. 1. (1993).  
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surveillance situation confronted by courts will have been addressed in 
an existing study of surveillance’s concrete harms.   
Yet courts can usefully test their intuitions about the harms caused 
by surveillance against the available evidence, taking such evidence into 
account as they have a in a wide variety of constitutional and other cases, 
including Brown v. Board of Education,119 Roper v. Simmons,120 and countless 
others.121  Courts can also draw useful comparisons between known 
surveillance harms and those likely to be suffered in analogous cases.  
Moreover, judges and juries already conduct a somewhat similar inquiry 
in personal injury cases, where they assess damages for psychological 
pain and suffering.122   
 
3. Less Invasive Means 
 
Finally, the normative test incorporates a requirement that courts 
consider whether there is a less invasive practice that could reveal 
roughly the same information as the challenged practice.  If a surveillance 
technique is invasive or affects an entire population, and a feasible 
alternative could obtain the same information in a less invasive or more 
targeted way, that would weigh in favor of finding a Fourth Amendment 
search.  If alternative techniques would not be as effective or would be 
                                                 
119 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). 
120 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005). 
121 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2489–91 (2014); Graham v. Fla., 
560 U.S. 48, 68–69, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–27 (2010); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 
U.S. 417, 469–70 (1990); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 
50–52 (1986).  Social science and other scientific research is also routinely 
analyzed in administrative law cases.  See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 
533 U.S. 525, 559–60 (2001). 
122 Tokson, supra note 10, at 199; see Sean Hannon Williams, Self-Altering Injury: 
The Hidden Harms of Hedonic Adaptation, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 543–44 & n.42 
(2011) (collecting cases involving hedonic damages). The inquiry proposed here 
would likely be substantially easier, as the psychological harm from 
surveillance need only be situated somewhere on the general scale from low to 
high and would not have to be translated into a precise money value. Fact 
finders tend to be far more consistent in performing the former calculation than 
the latter. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on 
Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2097−2103 & tbl.1 (1998) 
(finding that mock jurors assessing various hypothetical cases tend to give 
consistent rankings of blameworthiness but very different damages awards).  
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prohibitively costly, that would weigh against finding a search.   
Courts currently apply a similar, albeit stricter, standard in cases 
involving the Wiretap Act, which directs the government to show that it 
has attempted less invasive surveillance before applying for a wiretap.123  
In Fourth Amendment law, the Supreme Court has expressly considered 
the availability of less invasive means when assessing the 
constitutionality of conducting blood tests on suspected drunk drivers.124  
This factor is also based in part on the intermediate scrutiny test in free 
speech law, which directs courts to approve restrictions on certain types 
of speech only if the restrictions do not burden substantially more speech 
than is necessary to serve a significant government interest.125  Similarly, 
the existence here of a potentially less restrictive alternative would not 
definitively render a surveillance technique unlawful, but it would be a 
factor that favors applying a warrant requirement.126  
 
D. Omitted Factors  
 
The proposed test, like any Fourth Amendment test, cannot 
incorporate every potential surveillance harm or every abstract Fourth 
Amendment value without devolving into a “totality of the 
circumstances” standard.  Accordingly, the test does not analyze every 
circumstance or examine every theory that might bear on the normative 
assessment of a surveillance practice.  Conceptually, it emphasizes 
pragmatic and contextual theories of surveillance rather than more 
abstract theories that center on control over information, autonomy, or 
personality development.127  The latter theories operate at too high a level 
                                                 
123 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012); United States v. Carter, 449 F.3d 1287, 1293 
(D.C. Cir. 2006). 
124 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184, (2016) (holding that police 
officers cannot warrantlessly conduct blood tests incident to arrest because 
“[b]lood tests are significantly more intrusive [than breath tests], and their 
reasonableness must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive 
alternative of a breath test”). 
125 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). 
126 See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) 
(explaining that intermediate scrutiny requires only a reasonable fit between 
means and ends, and does not require that the government select the least 
restrictive means possible). 
127 E.g., Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (defining privacy as 
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of abstraction to be useful in a legal test.  The normative approach 
proposed here focuses on the more concrete harms of surveillance in 
order to remain workable for judges and capable of consistent 
application.  
Yet the test’s focus on foregone activities and the psychological 
harms of surveillance can also capture many of the concerns that drive 
the more abstract theories of privacy.  Consider theories of privacy and 
autonomy, which focus on the need to preserve a private zone within 
which individuals can develop and choose free of social coercion.128  Such 
coercion can cause the targets of surveillance to conform their behavior 
to perceived social norms by foregoing legitimate but potentially 
embarrassing activities.129  And the social pressures inherent in many 
forms of surveillance can result in psychological stress and harm.130  
These foregone activities and psychological harms would be captured by 
the normative test.  Likewise, the test’s consideration of physical harms 
resulting from police investigatory activity is in accord with theories of 
privacy that focus on bodily integrity and personal dignity.131  These 
more abstract values are captured at least in part by the proposed test, 
even though they are not overtly included. 
In any event, the impossibility of capturing every surveillance harm 
in a single test mirrors the impossibility of capturing every facet of law 
enforcement benefit.  Both the deterrence effects and the retributivist 
values served by law enforcement are unlikely to be fully captured, for 
instance.  Any workable balancing test will elide some quantum of harm 
and benefit on both sides.  One of the virtues of such tests is that they 
typically leave out far less than other types of legal standards.132 
The normative test also reflects a variety of the more abstract Fourth 
                                                 
“the control we have over information about ourselves”); Anita L. Allen, 
Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 738 (1999) (“Privacy has value 
relative to normative conceptions of spiritual personality, political freedom, 
health and welfare, human dignity, and autonomy.”).  
128 See Cohen, supra note 48, at 1377, 1424. 
129 Richards, supra note 56, at 403–04; Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, 
Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 186 (2008). 
130  See supra Section I.C.2.c. 
131 See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 
359, 388 (2000). 
132 See infra Part III.A. 
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Amendment values identified by courts and scholars, such as privacy, 
liberty, or security.133  One advantage of a pragmatic approach is that the 
practical harms of surveillance are often common denominators among 
the various abstract theories of Fourth Amendment principles.134  Indeed, 
to the extent that courts and historians have identified a single general 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, that purpose is itself more functional 
than abstract: to protect citizens from arbitrary government intrusions.135  
Given this shared practical foundation, it is unsurprising that the various 
theories of Fourth Amendment values overlap more than they conflict.136  
The common functional goals of these various theories, at least as they 
relate to Fourth Amendment “searches,” are largely captured by the 
proposed test.137 
 
II. DOCTRINAL AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FOURTH 
AMENDMENT BALANCING 
                                                 
133 See Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of Privacy as the Central Value Protected by 
the Fourth Amendment’s Prohibition on Unreasonable Searches, 48 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 143, 157–62 (2015) (collecting studies identifying different but closely 
related Fourth Amendment principles). 
134 See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment 
After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18 (2009) (discussing state intrusions on 
same-sex intimacy and noting the link between principles of liberty and the 
protection of intimate relationships); Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: 
Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1101–07 (1998) 
(discussing state intrusions on private decisions surrounding relationships and 
arguing that the right of privacy is fundamentally a right of protection of 
personal relationships). 
135 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) (“[T]he 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United 
States against arbitrary action by their own Government”); Wolf v. Colorado, 
338 U.S. 25, 28–29 (1949) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against arbitrary intrusion by the police is part of the Due Process guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original 
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 556 (1999) (discussing “the larger 
purpose for which the Framers adopted the text; namely to curb the exercise of 
discretionary authority by officers”). 
136 John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 WIS. L. 
REV. 655, 675 (2008); Slobogin, supra note 133, at 152–54.   
137 The Fourth Amendment also protects against unreasonable “seizures,” a 
separate prohibition than the one addressed here and one that embodies the 
values of protection of property and freedom from arrest. 
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In setting out the normative model, the previous Part discussed some 
of the legal and theoretical foundations of its factors.  This Part briefly 
examines doctrinal, historical, and theoretical support for a normative 
balancing approach in general.  The Fourth Amendment’s text and its 
broader purposes are consistent with the balancing of law enforcement 
benefits against the costs of surveillance.  The language and history of the 
Amendment evince a concern with effective law enforcement as well as 
citizen privacy.  Moreover, both the leading originalist interpretation of 
the Amendment and less formalist theories of construction point to a 
balancing approach.    
 
A. The Fourth Amendment’s Balance 
 
Balancing is inherent in Fourth Amendment law, as reflected in the 
Amendment’s history, language, and purposes.  The very concept of 
warrants supported by “probable cause”138 contemplates a balancing 
between law enforcement interests and citizen privacy.  The government 
can obtain a search warrant only if it has sufficient cause to believe the 
search will uncover a crime.  Once the government has sufficient cause, 
it can search citizens and their property despite the considerable harms 
to privacy and liberty that might result.  Indeed, the police can enter the 
house of a totally innocent person to arrest a criminal or seize contraband 
possessed by a houseguest.139  Neither the interests of individuals in 
avoiding government intrusions nor the interests of law enforcement are 
absolute.   
Founding-era practices likewise evinced a non-absolutist approach 
to searches and seizures.  Unlawful searches were addressed with civil 
liability rather than the exclusion of evidence.140  The trespass actions that 
provided a basis for Fourth Amendment protection were themselves 
tempered by doctrines of necessity, which allowed trespasses when 
                                                 
138 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
139 See Steagald v. United States 451 U.S. 204, 213, 222 (1981) (stating that the 
police could enter the house of an innocent third party to arrest a felon if they 
had a search warrant or probable cause and exigency). 
140 See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials (C.B.). 
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necessary to prevent public or private harm.141  Unwarranted invasions 
were generally excused if contraband was discovered.142  In each 
situation, citizens’ protections against government intrusions were 
counterweighted by other values and defeasible in cases involving 
probable cause, public or private necessity, or actual guilt. 
The balancing inherent in Fourth Amendment law does not dictate 
that courts must balance when examining the scope of the Amendment—
perhaps balancing should be confined to other aspects of Fourth 
Amendment law, or eschewed altogether.143  But a normative balancing 
test for scope is consistent with the structure and traditional practice of 
the Fourth Amendment.   
 
B. Text, Originalism, and Determinacy 
 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches,” a phrase 
that is not defined and is susceptible to a wide variety of meanings.144  The 
dominant view of the Fourth Amendment is that its text and history are 
of little or no help in determining its scope.145  Yet a number of scholars 
contend that the scope of the Amendment is determinable by reference to 
the original public meaning of the relevant phrase.146  
                                                 
141 See, e.g., Campbell v. Race, 61 Mass. 408, 410−11 (1851) (collecting American 
and English sources describing the common law rule that encroachment on 
private property was permitted when a highway becomes impassable); 
Mouse’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B.) 1342; 12 Co. Rep. 64 (property 
may be trespassorily destroyed if necessary to save lives).  
142 See, e.g., Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 310 (1818); Akhil Reed 
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 767 (1994) 
(collecting sources). 
143 See discussion infra Part IV.C.   
144 See Matthew Tokson, Blank Slates, 59 B.C. L. REV. 591, 627−30 (2018).  
145 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 
SUP. CT. REV. 67, 70; Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 395. 
146 See, e.g., Brief of Scholars of the History and Original Meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, Carpenter v. United 
States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402), 2017 WL 3530961 [hereinafter 
Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief]; DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN 
AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 251 (2017); Amar, supra note 142, at 767.  There are 
other forms of originalist interpretation, including “original methods 
originalism,” which recommend interpreting the Constitution by reference to 
the methods of legal interpretation used at the time of the Founding.  See, e.g.,  
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This Article does not undertake to resolve this debate, because it 
need not resolve it—both major views of the determinism of the Fourth 
Amendment’s text are consistent with the normative balancing approach.  
Indeed, both counsel weighing the harms of surveillance against law 
enforcement justifications in order to determine which investigations the 
police can perform without any quantifiable suspicion.  This section 
explores theories regarding the determinacy of the Fourth Amendment 
and shows how they provide further support for Fourth Amendment 
balancing.  
 
1. Fourth Amendment Searches as Textually 
Determinate 
  
Several Fourth Amendment scholars have argued that the term 
“search” in the context of the Fourth Amendment gives specific guidance 
as to the scope of the Amendment.147  They contend that the Amendment 
applies to any “search” in the broadest sense of that term, meaning any 
act of seeking, gathering information, or looking at something.148  Thus a 
government official looking at a house or a crowd of people would be 
conducting a warrantless Fourth Amendment search.149  Many such 
searches would be lawful, however, because they would be 
“reasonable.”150  Reasonableness would no longer require a warrant 
supported by probable cause as a default rule, but would be a more 
general inquiry into whether a search had a “good and sufficient 
justification” and was not “greater than is fit” or “immoderate.”151   
Although the reasonableness inquiry is an amorphous, “common sense” 
                                                 
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A 
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 N.W. U. 
L. Rev. 751, 786−87 (2009).  The predominant originalist approach in the Fourth 
Amendment context focuses on original public meaning, and that is the 
approach discussed in this section. 
147 See supra note 146. 
148 Amar, supra note 142, at 768−69; GRAY, supra note 146, at 251; Originalist 
Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 146, at 6−7.   
149 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 142, at 768; Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief, 
supra note 146, at 13. 
150 Amar, supra note 142, at 769.  
151 Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 146, at 14–15. 
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sort of analysis,152 it would consider how intrusive a search is153 and 
whether the search is excessive in light of its justifications.154  
This interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is notably consistent 
with the balancing approach proposed in Part I.  Both approaches would 
resolve the question of when the government can engage in warrantless 
surveillance by making a normative inquiry to determine whether such 
surveillance is justified.  There are differences, of course.  This Article’s 
approach is more specific and less reliant on distant historical analogy 
than the originalist approaches.155  It would also conduct its balancing at 
the scope stage rather than the reasonableness stage of a Fourth 
Amendment case, preserving the longstanding role of warrants and 
probable cause in regulating police behavior.  The warrant requirement, 
unlike the Katz test, has not come under widespread attack by scholars or 
commentators.156  Indeed, many have argued for strengthening the 
requirement by limiting its various exceptions, and empirical data 
indicates that warranted searches are far more likely than unwarranted 
probable-cause searches to actually produce evidence of crime.157  The 
                                                 
152 Amar, supra note 142, at 801. 
153 Id. 
154 Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 146, at 15.  Note that this is not 
the only originalist interpretation of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.  Laura 
Donohue has argued that “unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment’s text 
refers to something “against the reason of the common law,” including 
warrantless entry into a home.  See Laura Donohue, The Original Fourth 
Amendment, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181, 1192 (2016).  This approach to Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness would be less consistent with the normative 
balancing approach proposed above, and would likely be more focused on 
government actions violating the common law.         
155 Cf. Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 146, at 3−4 (analyzing cell 
phone signal data collection by reference to the general warrants cases of the 
pre-Founding era). 
156 Cf. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 44−45 (2007) (suggesting that 
courts preserve ex ante review but advocating for the issuance of warrants on 
less than probable cause.   
157 See, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: 
Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 481 (1991); Wayne D. 
Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the Warrant 
Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 531 (1997); 
Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 
923−25 (2009).  
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normative test would avoid overturning more than a century of warrant-
requirement precedents and undermining effective ex ante judicial 
review of police surveillance.158  But the inquiry would be conceptually 
similar to the originalist inquiry, and it would make little difference to a 
police officer whether looking at a house without probable cause is lawful 
because it is not regulated by the Fourth Amendment or because it is 
“reasonable.”159  The normative test proposed here is congruous with the 
predominant originalist interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.160   
 
2. Fourth Amendment Searches as Textually 
Indeterminate 
 
The majority of scholars who have written on the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope consider its text and history to be indeterminate, or 
at best profoundly underdeterminate.161  Not only is the term “search” 
ambiguous and capable of multiple meanings,162 but the Supreme Court’s 
                                                 
158 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Perlman v. United States, 
247 U.S. 7 (1918); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); Bond v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 
(2014). 
159 See Amar, supra note 142, at 769. 
160 Indeed, to the extent that originalism incorporates values of stare decisis, the 
normative test may be the optimal originalist approach because it avoids 
overturning longstanding precedents.  See supra note 158. 
161 See supra note 145.  For a discussion of underdeterminacy and construction 
in legal interpretation, see Lawrence B. Solum, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 453, 458 
(2013).  Some originalist scholars have argued that underdeterminate text can 
be clarified by reference to the spirit of the constitutional provision at issue, i.e. 
its original function or purpose.   Randy E. Barnett & Evan Bernick, The Letter 
and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 Geo. L.J. 1, 3 (2018).  In this 
context, the generally acknowledged purposes of the Fourth Amendment are 
fairly abstract and may not substantially clarify the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment.  See Tokson, supra note 144, at 635 & n.279 (noting that historians 
generally consider the “bedrock purpose of the Fourth Amendment” to be the 
protection of “privacy, property, and liberty from undue intrusions by 
government officers,” and quoting several historians).  Assuming historians are 
correct that a core purpose of the Amendment was to protect values like 
privacy and liberty against government oppression, the test proposed here is 
likely congruent with an original-purpose-based approach.   
162 Kerr, supra note 145, at 628. 
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time-honored interpretation of “reasonable” as typically requiring a 
warrant or at least some articulable suspicion means that not every 
investigative act can be a search.163  The crucial question of when the 
police can conduct suspicionless surveillance is not answered in the text 
or history.164 
What should courts do when addressing an indeterminate law?  
General theories of legal indeterminacy typically conceive of judges who 
fill legal gaps as acting in a legislative capacity and attempting to reach 
optimal outcomes via a normative-style inquiry.165  This inquiry might 
entail the consideration of moral values, policy judgments, or personal 
experiences.166  Judges might accordingly weigh these types of 
considerations in addressing the Fourth Amendment’s scope in the 
absence of formal guidance.  These broad prescriptions do not mandate a 
balancing test, but they are certainly consistent with the use of normative 
balancing when addressing indeterminate law. 
Further, theories of indeterminacy that focus on how courts should 
formulate legal tests in the absence of determinate law directly support 
the use of a balancing test in the Fourth Amendment context.  The issue 
of the Fourth Amendment’s scope is normatively complex, covers a wide 
variety of government conduct, and has been repeatedly destabilized by 
technological and social change.167  Alternative, non-balancing standards 
may therefore fail to capture the fundamental values underlying the 
issue, and may not be much simpler to apply than a direct balancing 
test.168  Moreover, courts are increasingly likely to be able to obtain the 
                                                 
163 Tokson, supra note 144, at 640. 
164 Id. at 628–29. 
165 See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 197–99 (1979); Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 43 (1985). 
Ronald Dworkin takes a philosophically different approach to doctrinal 
indeterminacy that ultimately offers similar advice. See RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 124, 128 (1977) (describing the central role of political 
and personal convictions in Dworkinian adjudication). Dworkin argues that 
judges should address difficult legal questions by choosing the outcome that 
fits best with the overarching narrative or theory of law and with political 
morality. Id. at 107; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 138–43 (1985).  
166 See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 148 (1988); 
DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 38 (2010); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
HOW JUDGES THINK 82–83, 106–08 (2008). 
167 Tokson, supra note 144, at 614–15, 643–44. 
168 Id. at 644–45; Cloud, supra note 3, at 28–36.  
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information they need to effectively balance in the Fourth Amendment 
context.169  In such a situation, a balancing test is likely to be the optimal 
approach for courts faced with legal indeterminacy.170  General theories 
of legal indeterminacy are consistent with a normative balancing 
approach, and more detailed theories directly support such an approach.   
 
III. THE CASE FOR A NORMATIVE BALANCING MODEL 
 
The previous Parts have set out a normative balancing model for the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope, traced the lineage of its various factors, and 
given an account of its doctrinal, historical, and theoretical foundations.  
This Part details its more practical advantages: directness, adaptability to 
social and technological change, inclusion of non-privacy harms, 
harmonization of doctrine with practice, and applicability to broad 
surveillance programs.  These benefits are substantial.  Indeed, in a 
society where surveillance technology consistently advances and 
expectations of privacy continually shrink, these benefits may be 
indispensable.  
 
A. Directness  
 
A prominent advantage of the normative balancing approach is that 
it directly addresses the normative values at issue.  Courts need not use 
“false targets” or proxies that stand in for essential Fourth Amendment 
interests—they would examine those interests directly.  If judges can 
administer a balancing test effectively, then its outcomes should 
maximize societal welfare relative to other tests.   
                                                 
169 Tokson, supra note 144, at 645.  See generally Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats 
Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 773–
77 (2018) (discussing how courts might quantify damages from privacy 
breaches); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth 
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 335 (2008) (setting out the average perceived 
intrusiveness of various types of searches); Kathryn J. Kolb & John R. Aiello, 
Electronic Performance Monitoring and Social Context: Impact on Productivity and 
Stress, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 339, 339 (1995) (studying stress among the targets 
of surveillance). 
170 Tokson, supra note 144, at 613–16. 
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Of course, the other side of this coin is that balancing tests are 
generally difficult to administer, as discussed below.171  But a balancing 
approach is likely to be more effective than a narrower standard in this 
context.  Because the question of the Fourth Amendment’s scope is 
conceptually complex, broad, and subject to constant disruption by new 
technologies, it is unlikely that a narrow standard can effectively capture 
the fundamental values at stake.172  A balancing test, though hardly 
without drawbacks, avoids this fatal error.      
Relatedly, the normative approach embodies the balance that is 
inherent in the Fourth Amendment.173  It squarely addresses the purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment, directly assessing the harms of arbitrary 
government intrusions and the practical values of security, liberty, and 
privacy.174  It hews far more closely to traditional Fourth Amendment 
goals than does, for instance, the Katz test, which focuses on current 
societal expectations about privacy.    
 
B. Adaptability to Social and Technological Change 
 
The normative approach is especially adaptable to new 
circumstances and new surveillance technologies.  It looks to law 
enforcement benefits and practical privacy harms, no matter how those 
benefits and harms may manifest in a given surveillance context.  
Alternative tests are often more rigid and prone to destabilization by 
changing circumstances.   
Changes in surveillance practices and technologies have, for 
instance, repeatedly undermined narrower Fourth Amendment tests in 
the past.   In the early 20th century, the Supreme Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections were limited to the specific types of 
property enumerated in the “persons, houses, papers, and effects” clause 
of the Amendment.175  This property-based approach exposed telephone 
and other conversations to pervasive government monitoring, leading to 
                                                 
171 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
172 See supra Part II.B.2. 
173 See supra Part II.A. 
174 See supra note 57. 
175 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928). 
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egregious privacy violations and political abuses.176  The Court 
eventually adopted the Katz test, which expanded the Fourth 
Amendment’s coverage to intangible things and based it on expectations 
of privacy.  Yet the Katz test has itself been rapidly destabilized as threats 
to privacy proliferate, knowledge of such threats gradually spreads, and 
the cost-per-citizen of surveillance drops precipitously.177  In a society 
where the government can collect huge databases of personal 
information held by commercial third parties,178 engage in constant visual 
monitoring via drones or satellites,179 or mine email metadata to reveal 
intimate details about people’s lives,180 the concept of an expectation of 
privacy not grounded in legal protections is increasingly obsolete.   
Adaptability is especially important given the outsized role that 
social and technological change plays in Fourth Amendment law.  A 
normative balancing approach allows courts to take account of a novel 
surveillance context without depending on societal expectations or 
waiting for Congress to pass a law—a wait that might take decades.181  
The normative test is resilient to the changes that have undermined 
previous and current Fourth Amendment tests. 
 
C. Discrimination-Based Harms 
 
Many of the harms of surveillance are related to the loss of privacy 
                                                 
176 See, e.g., 2 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 183-84, 198−201 (GPO 1976).  
177 See Tokson, supra note 10, at 181−87. 
178 E.g., Chris J. Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little Helper: How Choicepoint and Other 
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 
N.C. J. INT’L. L. & COM. REG. 595, 635-37 (2004). 
179 Robert Draper, They are Watching You—and Everything Else on the Planet, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2018/02/surveillance-
watching-you.   
180 Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address 
Books Globally, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-
millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-
80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.12c9a3e97eb8. 
181 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) has not yet been 
meaningfully updated since it became law in 1986, despite massive advances 
and changes in email technology. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2703. 
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that occurs when a subject is observed by others.  But the Katz test’s 
exclusive focus on informational privacy fails to capture some of the most 
harmful aspects of government surveillance: discrimination, coercion, 
intimidation, and physical harm.182  Routine police encounters on public 
sidewalks or roads, for instance, may have little impact on informational 
privacy but nonetheless may harm individuals through coercion or the 
threat of violence.183  The normative test takes a broader view of Fourth 
Amendment privacy and protection, one that considers the personal 
harms of surveillance whether they arise from observation or from more 
direct tactics of intimidation or coercion.184   
Non-privacy harms may be especially important when surveillance 
reflects discrimination against certain groups or otherwise expresses 
societal condemnation of surveillance targets.  State surveillance can have 
a powerful expressive component, conveying the message that its targets 
are low status members of society, unworthy of trust, or inherently 
dangerous.185  Discrimination itself, including discrimination associated 
with police practices, can cause serious short-term psychological and 
physical effects including stress, depression, elevated heart rate, and high 
blood pressure.186  Over the long term, such discrimination is correlated 
with a variety of health problems such as heart attacks and strokes.187  
Surveillance programs that target or disproportionately affect a particular 
demographic group may cause serious harms to individuals that should 
be taken into account in a Fourth Amendment analysis.  The normative 
test allows courts to directly consider such harms when assessing a 
government surveillance practice. 
  
D. Harmonizing Practice and Doctrine 
                                                 
182 Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1065–66. 
183 Id. 
184 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.  
185 See Craig Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions, 102 IOWA L. 
REV. 1533, 1563−68 (2017). 
186 See, e.g., Abigail A. Sewell & Kevin A. Jefferson, Collateral Damage: The Health 
Effects of Invasive Police Encounters in New York City, 93 J. URBAN HEALTH 542, 
543 (2016); Pamela J. Sawyer, et al., Discrimination and the Stress Response: 
Psychological and Physiological Consequences of Anticipating Prejudice in Interethnic 
Interactions, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1020 (2012).   
187 See Sawyer, et al., supra note 174, at 1020. 
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The Katz test directs courts to assess society’s expectations of privacy, 
and many courts faithfully attempt to do so.  Lower courts especially tend 
to address novel Fourth Amendment scope questions by attempting to 
calculate societal knowledge and expectations about surveillance 
practices.188  The Supreme Court frequently does the same, looking 
explicitly to our “everyday expectations of privacy”189 and what people 
“typically know”190 in determining the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment.191  The results and reasoning of such cases are frequently 
criticized, but we might at least admire these courts’ fidelity to governing 
precedent.192 
Yet many Fourth Amendment cases, especially at the Supreme Court 
level, appear to be driven by normative concerns rather than doctrinal 
ones.193  Consider the third-party doctrine, which states that people waive 
their Fourth Amendment rights in things that they voluntarily disclose to 
a third party.  This infamous doctrine threatens privacy in a vast swath 
of personal data in the internet age.  Yet, even before it was expressly 
limited in Carpenter v. United States,194 the third-party doctrine has seemed 
to disappear whenever it would produce a particularly unjust outcome.195  
In a typical third-party doctrine case, exposure of something to a third 
                                                 
188 See Tokson, supra note, at 154, 156−58, 161−63 (describing numerous 
examples of lower courts attempting to assess the extent of societal knowledge 
in order to determine societal expectations of privacy). 
189 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990).  
190 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979). 
191 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338−39 (2000); California v. 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 
(1985). 
192 See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 156, at 151−64 (2007); Lewis R. Katz, In Search 
of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 564-66 
(1990). 
193 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2236 (2018) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 503, 519 (2007). 
194 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (holding that bank 
records were not protected by the Fourth Amendment because they are 
exposed to bank employees in the ordinary course of business).   
195 Neil Richards notes a similar phenomenon in Richards, supra note 32, at 
1468−73, contending that the Supreme Court was always more concerned with 
the unrevealing nature of the information at issue in the third-party doctrine 
cases than with the fact of disclosure to third parties. 
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party’s employees eliminates Fourth Amendment protection in that 
thing.196  Yet in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court held that a state 
hospital’s program of surreptitiously testing patients’ urine for cocaine 
violated the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that patients voluntarily 
turned over their urine to hospital employees.197  And the Court held in 
Stoner v. California that the police must obtain a search warrant to enter a 
hotel room despite the fact that “maids, janitors, or repairmen” routinely 
enter and observe the room in the normal course of business.198  Recently, 
in Carpenter, several dissenting Justices reasonably complained that the 
court’s decision to extend the Fourth Amendment to cell phone location 
data appeared driven by normative considerations rather than the literal 
Katz test.199  Policy considerations, rather than societal expectations, seem 
to dictate the outcomes of several other Fourth Amendment cases as 
well.200  Indeed, they appear to drive the outcomes of some cases that 
purport to turn on neutral concepts like trespass and property.201 
The normative test directs courts to give an account of the core 
normative considerations that appear to drive a substantial portion of the 
Supreme Court’s cases.  It would have the benefit of making the Court’s 
actual rationales for its decisions visible and subject to scrutiny.  When 
the Supreme Court reaches an essentially normative decision but 
obscures its reasoning behind one Katz doctrine or another, observers are 
                                                 
196 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
197 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001).  The court granted 
certiorari only on the issue of whether the testing fit within the special needs 
exception and assumed a lack of patient consent, but the dissenting Justices 
noted that the patients’ consent was obvious and provided a clear basis to 
resolve the case.  Id. at 76; id. at 92−96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
198 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964). 
199 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2236 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2265 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
200 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding that dog sniffs for 
contraband are not searches regardless of people’s expectations of privacy); 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (holding that testing substances 
for contraband is not a search); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) 
(expressly considering the benefits and costs of permitting warrantless searches 
of prison cells); Kerr, supra note 193, at 519−22. 
201 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013), (finding a Fourth Amendment 
search under the Jones trespass test despite the absence of a trespass, based 
largely on novel claims about the social norms that govern approaching a 
doorstep). 
 DRAFT - Forthcoming, 104 Minnesota L. Rev. (2019) 
42 
 
less able to predict future cases, detect judicial bias, or understand 
existing law.  The normative test would better align the outcomes of 
Fourth Amendment cases with their actual rationales, promoting 
transparency and judicial credibility. 
 
E. Aggregation and Spillover 
 
The normative test would help courts to address the Fourth 
Amendment issues raised by aggregated programs of surveillance.  
Wide-ranging surveillance programs can yield massive databases of 
citizens’ information.  These vast collections of data can be analyzed to 
reveal far more than would be revealed by any single act of 
investigation.202  Aggregated surveillance programs are increasingly 
problematic as the cost-per-citizen of surveillance and analysis decreases.   
Current Fourth Amendment approaches are largely blind to the 
dangers of aggregate surveillance.  Courts have rightly been criticized for 
their transactional, non-systematic approach to Fourth Amendment 
questions.203  Although courts occasionally look to the future impacts of 
their decisions, they generally assess each investigatory act in isolation 
rather than considering surveillance programs as a whole.204  This is 
problematic because, in practice, Fourth Amendment decisions that 
permit the government to surveil one specific individual effectively grant 
the government the power to surveil citizens en masse.  In several 
situations, the government has done just that.  The Supreme Court’s 
holding that the government may collect Michael Lee Smith’s dialed 
telephone numbers justified the NSA’s collection of millions of citizens’ 
dialed phone numbers and the DEA’s decades-long program of collecting 
telephone metadata on all calls from the United States to other 
countries.205  The Court’s holding that the address information on a postal 
                                                 
202 Renan, supra note 65, at 1056.   
203 Renan, supra note 65, at 1053; Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, 
Redefining What's “Reasonable”: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 281, 298 (2016). 
204 Renan, supra note 65, at 1053.  At times, Fourth Amendment analyses are 
overtly narrow, for example, looking to the specific terms of a particular 
defendant’s privacy policy. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 
2010). 
205 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979); see Renan, supra note 65, at 
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letter is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment eventually became the 
basis for a government program of scanning every mailed envelope into 
a massive database of postal communications.206  These aggregate 
programs of surveillance have a capacity to infringe on citizens’ privacy 
that is greater than the sum of their parts, and they raise questions that 
the Court does not even contemplate under traditional Fourth 
Amendment tests.207   
The normative test is better suited for addressing widespread 
surveillance and the collection of large databases of citizens’ personal 
information.  It directs courts to assess surveillance at a programmatic 
level, under the presumption that the government will pursue 
unregulated surveillance as broadly as resource constraints allow, as it 
has repeatedly done in the modern era.208  Thus it has the benefit of 
aligning courts’ assessments with the likely consequences of their 
decisions.   
A related problem in Fourth Amendment law is that of spillover, 
meaning, among other things, that information collected for one purpose 
may later be used for other, more invasive or problematic purposes.209  
For instance, section 702 of FISA authorizes intelligence agencies to 
monitor the phone calls and electronic communications of non-U.S. 
persons.210  But the intelligence program also collects the data and 
communications of U.S. citizens communicating with non-U.S. citizens.211  
This information is then accessible by the FBI for domestic law 
enforcement purposes, and the FBI uses it “[w]ith some frequency” for 
                                                 
1055.   
206 Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); Ron Nixon, Report Reveals Wider 
Tracking of Mail in U.S., NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 27, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/us/us-secretly-monitoring-mail-of-
thousands.html. 
207 See Renan, supra note 65, at 1056. 
208 See infra notes 205−206.  See also Renan, supra note 65, at 1059 (discussing 
uses of license plate scanning to monitor people’s movements). 
209 See id. at 1060−67. 
210 See, e.g., Erin Kelly, What is the Section 702 surveillance program and why should 
you care?, USA Today, Jan. 11, 2018, available at 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/01/11/what-section-
702-surveillance-program-and-why-should-you-care/1025582001/. 
211 Id.  
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purely domestic law enforcement.212  Similar problems arise with data 
collected by private parties and then purchased or obtained by the 
government for more invasive or de-anonymized uses.213 
Although secondary uses of information are difficult to regulate 
under any standard, the normative test is more compatible with judicial 
scrutiny of, for instance, transfers of data between government agencies 
or between private data brokers and government officials.214  While Katz’s 
expectations-of-privacy analysis is largely incompatible with the concept 
of regulating law enforcement collection of already-gathered 
information,215 the normative approach could allow courts to determine 
that a transfer of information to law enforcement entities is regulated by 
the Fourth Amendment based on its substantial potential for additional 
surveillance harms.216  
IV. OBJECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES 
 
Any test for the Fourth Amendment’s scope will have drawbacks as 
well as advantages.  Normative balancing’s advantages are arguably 
essential to an effective Fourth Amendment test.  Yet objections might be 
raised that counsel against adopting normative balancing nonetheless.  
This Part responds to some potential objections to a Fourth Amendment 
balancing test.  In the course of doing so, it touches on the deficiencies of 
the current test, which carries many of the same drawbacks as the 
normative test with virtually none of the benefits.  This Part also discusses 
the leading potential alternative to the Katz test: the positive law 
approach.  In doing so, it develops another argument for the normative 
test—even accounting for its disadvantages, it is superior to the 
alternatives.   
 
                                                 
212  PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE 
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT 59 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf.  
213 See, e.g., Renan, supra note 65, at 1062−63. 
214 See generally Ric Simmons, The Mirage of Use Restrictions, 96 N.C. L. REV. 133 
(2017) (discussing the difficulty of creating effective use restrictions on 
government agencies). 
215 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1984). 
216 See generally supra Part I.C.2. 
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A. Administrability and Institutional Capacity 
 
One potential objection to the normative balancing test concerns its 
administrability.  Multifactor balancing standards tend to be more 
complex and to have higher decision costs than other potential tests.217  
Relatedly, courts may lack the institutional capacity to effectively apply 
a balancing test.  The normative approach asks judges to consider the 
likely effects of legal regulation on police and citizen behavior, a policy 
inquiry that may be better suited to a legislature.218  Although balancing 
is a fundamental practice of courts (and the central metaphor of judging 
involves balance scales), judges may be more effective applying narrower 
standards or bright-line rules.219   
The normative test is designed to mitigate some of the 
administrability issues and decision costs inherent in balancing tests.  It 
focuses on actual practices and communications as well as measurable 
internal harms rather than abstract concepts of privacy or security.  It is 
also designed to allow judges to consult intuitions about the potential 
effects of surveillance on their own behaviors.220  Thus it is likely to be 
more administrable than many balancing tests commonly used in other 
areas of law.221  Further, balancing tests in general are well suited to 
rulification, and the development of sub-rules to govern particular 
situations is likely to reduce decision costs and increase administrability 
over time.222 
                                                 
217 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 572–86 (1992).  Concerns about decision costs may be mitigated somewhat 
by the fact that stare decisis will resolve the vast majority of Fourth 
Amendment decisions under any standard.  See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. 
Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General 
Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 1149, 1153−58 (1998). 
218 See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 811 (2004).   
219 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L.J. 943, 944 (1987). 
220 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 82. 
221 See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (weighing the 
interests of states against the burdens placed on interstate commerce); 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (weighing a government 
employees’ interest in free speech against the interests of the government in 
efficiently providing public services). 
222 See Tokson, supra note 144, at 652. 
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More broadly, courts appear able to effectively apply balancing tests 
that consider the effects of legal regulation in a wide variety of contexts.  
First Amendment law is famously a domain of balancing tests, which 
allow courts to robustly protect free speech without unduly hampering 
legitimate government activities.223  Similar balancing tests are also 
employed in the law of equal protection,224 procedural due process,225 the 
Fifth Amendment,226 the dormant Commerce Clause,227 torts,228 and 
confidentiality.229  Although a definitive analysis of balancing in these 
areas would require thousands of pages, the ubiquity of balancing tests 
suggests that courts are hardly incapable of applying them.   
Finally, although administrability is a concern with any balancing 
test, such a test could hardly be less administrable than Katz.230  Although 
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test is confusing enough on its 
face, the test in practice is even more complex and puzzling.  Frustrated 
by the failures of the Katz test to embody important Fourth Amendment 
principles, courts have expanded and modified the test haphazardly.231  
As Orin Kerr famously described, courts have created multiple, 
conflicting versions of the test, sometimes applying it literally, sometimes 
looking to positive law for guidance, sometimes emphasizing the thing 
being investigated, and sometimes focusing mostly on policy 
considerations.232  Lower courts applying Katz in cases of first impression 
must choose between these various conflicting models, yet there is no law 
or norm that tells them how to make this crucial decision.233  
                                                 
223 See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second 
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 386 (2009).  
224 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
225 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 326 (1976). 
226 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656−57 (1984). 
227 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
228 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
229 See Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal System, Ellen E. 
Deason, 17 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 239 (2002). 
230 See, e.g., Baude & Stern, supra note 4, at 1825, 1860 (noting Katz’s notorious 
lack of administrability); see also Solove, supra note 5, at 1511; Etzioni, supra note 
204, at 420–21; Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
231 See Tokson, supra note 144, at 647−48. 
232 Kerr, supra note 193, at 507–08. 
233 Although Orin Kerr has argued that certain patterns might help guide lower 
court behavior, courts appear unaware of these patterns and any such 
guidelines as to model selection appear to be faint and inconsistent.  See Lior 
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Unsurprisingly, in novel cases, Fourth Amendment law under the Katz 
test is unpredictable and chaotic.234  By contrast, the normative test directs 
a court to overtly weigh the normative considerations at issue and to 
explain its actual reasons for reaching its conclusions.  Not only is this a 
more rigorous approach, it is a more honest one, and it can help facilitate 
the development of efficient sub-rules over time.235 
 
B. Unpredictability 
 
A potential objection to normative approaches in general is that they 
may be unpredictable and inconsistent across cases.  Different judges 
may reach conflicting normative conclusions or may frame policy 
questions differently, leading to splits among lower courts.236  Police 
officers using new surveillance techniques or facing novel situations may 
have difficulty determining whether they can lawfully surveil without a 
warrant.237  Ideally, a Fourth Amendment test would be predictable and 
simple enough for courts and police officers alike.238  
There are several reasons to think that unpredictability is not as 
significant a problem as it may seem, however.  First, while police officers 
can simply follow established law in most cases, they are unlikely to be 
able to resolve difficult Fourth Amendment questions of first impression 
under any viable test, normative or otherwise.  The Fourth Amendment’s 
remedial doctrines already take ample consideration of this difficulty.  
Qualified immunity limits officers’ liability to those cases where officers 
violate clearly established law,239 and the good faith doctrine prevents the 
                                                 
Strahilevitz & Matthew Tokson, Should Fourth Amendment Law Pay Attention to 
What People Expect? If So, How?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2017/11/should-fourth-
amendment-pay-attention-to-what-people-expect-if-so-how.html. 
234 See id.; Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Solove, supra note 5, at 1519–20. 
235 Tokson, supra note 144, at 619. 
236 Orin Kerr, supra note 193, at 536−37. 
237 Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in A World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 
1309, 1333–34 (2012); Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 403–04. 
238 Wayne R. LaFave, ‘Case-by-Case Adjudication’ Versus ‘Standardized Procedures': 
The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141–42 (1974). 
239 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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exclusion of evidence where officers rely on law that is later 
overturned.240  Even if these doctrines were to disappear, the 
indemnification of police officers would prevent officers from facing 
personal consequences for non-egregious legal violations.241  Moreover, 
tests that are simple enough to permit police officers to reliably answer 
novel Fourth Amendment questions may be profoundly deficient in other 
respects, such as drastically underprotecting privacy or protecting it in 
an extremely arbitrary manner.242   
Second, under any Fourth Amendment test, a large majority of cases 
will be governed by precedent and stare decisis.  The Supreme Court has 
already resolved how the Fourth Amendment applies in a wide variety 
of familiar surveillance contexts, including houses, cars, investigatory 
stops, inventory searches, searches incident to arrest, border stops, and 
many forms of electronic surveillance.243  These precedents should 
continue to guide courts and police officers under a normative test, even 
as courts discard the Katz test which provided the nominal basis for many 
of their outcomes.  The values of stare decisis counsel preserving the 
results of these cases, upon which law enforcement officials have long 
relied.244  In addition, normative considerations often drove the results of 
these cases far more than Katz’s ambiguous “expectations of privacy” 
inquiry.245  A few existing cases should be overturned under the new test, 
but stare decisis suggests overturning only cases that are especially 
flawed.246   
Finally, the normative test would perform no worse than the current 
test in terms of predictability and consistency.  For the reasons discussed 
above,247 it is very difficult to predict how any case of first impression will 
                                                 
240 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 353–54 (1987). 
241 Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 936 (2014).  
242 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment is limited to physical trespasses against tangible things). 
243 See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the 
Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 
1149, 1153−58 (1998). 
244 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000). 
245 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 40 (2001); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 662−63 (1979).  
246 See infra Part V.C; Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984). 
247 See supra notes 232−234 and accompanying text. 
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be resolved under Katz.248  Lower courts facing novel Fourth Amendment 
questions frequently produce splits249 or rule unanimously only to see 
their rulings rejected by the Supreme Court.250  A normative test 
grounded in the analysis of actual surveillance harm and law 
enforcement benefit, aided by studies of the measurable effects of 
surveillance, would if anything be more consistent than the multi-model 
Katz regime.   
 
C. Redundancy 
 
Another potential argument against a balancing test for the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope is that it would be redundant in some cases, because 
the Court sometimes uses a balancing approach in determining whether 
a Fourth Amendment search or seizure is “reasonable.”251  A test that 
balances to determine whether something is a Fourth Amendment search 
and then sometimes balances to determine whether that search is 
reasonable would be partially redundant and could impose high decision 
costs on courts.    
Yet courts applying a balancing test for the Fourth Amendment’s 
scope would not have to balance again at the reasonableness stage, even 
in the subset of cases that use a reasonableness balancing test.  First, 
although courts in Fourth Amendment cases often weigh the policy 
implications of their rulings, overt balancing tests are relatively rare in 
Fourth Amendment law, especially in cases regulating law 
enforcement.252  Courts tend to balance in “special needs” cases that are 
                                                 
248 Id. 
249 Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth 
Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1195 (2012) (listing nearly forty unresolved 
circuit splits on Fourth Amendment issues). 
250 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (rejecting the 
unanimous holding of several federal courts of appeal that cell phone location 
information is not protected by the Fourth Amendment).  
251 Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, 
Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 237 
(2015).   
252 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (noting that 
“search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized 
suspicion of wrongdoing” and the Court has “recognized only limited 
circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply.”); Chandler v. Miller, 520 
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likely to involve “minimal” privacy interests and government interests 
other than the traditional investigation of crime.253  To date, special needs 
cases virtually always involve seizures or very clear searches such as 
building inspections.254  The only issue is their reasonableness; the Fourth 
Amendment’s application to the situation is obvious.   
It might be objected that reasonableness balancing is not limited to 
special needs cases, even if those cases are the only ones that regularly 
employ balancing tests.255  Courts occasionally weigh competing 
considerations when addressing novel questions of reasonableness.256  
But such cases almost always involve obvious seizures (such as car stops 
and Terry stops) and thus do not address the test for Fourth Amendment 
searches in any event.257  In addition, these cases are rare—the default 
rule for searches still requires a valid warrant,258 and the vast majority of 
                                                 
U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (“To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search 
ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”); see 
generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (holding that a police 
search of the contents of a cell phone incident to arrest was unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment and therefore required a warrant); California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991) (holding that the police can search a container 
in an automobile without a warrant only if they have probable cause).   
253 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (“In limited 
circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are 
minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the 
intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized 
suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.”); 
see also, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 
(1989) (stating that balancing is appropriate “where a Fourth Amendment 
intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement”). 
254 See, e.g., Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); 
Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 530−31 (1967). 
255 Excessive force claims are generally evaluated under a totality of the 
circumstances test that may incorporate balancing.  See Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386, 396 (1989).  These cases inherently involve seizures, thus a normative 
balancing test for searches is unnecessary. 
256 See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth 
Amendment, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 589, 602–03 (2014) (discussing this process in 
the context of investigative stops); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's 
Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 1012 (collecting cases).   
257 For additional examples, see Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704–05 
(1981).    
258 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). 
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cases that depart from that rule simply apply a suspicion-based standard 
such as probable cause or reasonable suspicion.259   
What if a case were to someday arise that presented both a difficult 
“search” question and a special needs issue or a novel reasonableness 
question that might require the court to weigh policy interests in the 
course of fashioning a new rule?  Even then, the normative balancing 
test proposed above would displace or at least strongly inform any 
balancing performed at the reasonableness stage.  If a surveillance 
technique caused concrete harms that outweighed its law enforcement 
benefits such that it required Fourth Amendment regulation, then both 
that fact and the extent of the harms and benefits would inform the 
Court’s reasonableness inquiry.  Most likely, no additional balancing 
would be required.  Even in the rarest hypothetical case, it is unlikely 
that redundant balancing would be an issue. 
 
D. Balancing and Bias 
 
Finally, a potential objection to a balancing test for the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope is that such a test will be biased in favor of the 
government.  Several scholars have noted that courts applying overt 
balancing tests to determine the reasonableness of a seizure or search 
often favor the government.260  One might extrapolate from this that 
balancing inherently favors the government in the Fourth Amendment 
context.261   
Although the government often prevails in cases where the court 
departs from the default warrant requirement and engages in balancing, 
it is unlikely that the balancing is to blame.  Courts typically engage in 
reasonableness balancing after identifying a case as unique—as a “special 
                                                 
259 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (noting that 
“search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized 
suspicion of wrongdoing” and the Court has “recognized only limited 
circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply.”).  
260 Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (2013); 
Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
254, 296–97 (2011). 
261 Richard Re, Fourth Amendment Fairness, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1409, 1419 (2018); 
Sundby, supra note 3, at 1765. 
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needs” case rather than a normal one.262  Special needs cases are generally 
outside the realm of traditional law enforcement, involving non-criminal 
administrative enforcement,263 children in school,264 non-criminal drug 
testing,265 and similar scenarios.266  The paradigm special needs case 
involves “privacy interests [that] are minimal” and “important 
governmental interest[s].”267  By classifying a case as special needs, the 
court has largely already determined that its intrusions are minimal and 
the government’s needs unique, even before reasonableness is assessed.  
It is little wonder that the balancing in such cases is usually resolved in 
the government’s favor.   
There is, in other words, a strong selection effect at work here.  
Courts overtly balance only in those cases where they feel that a default 
warrant requirement is inappropriate.268  And yet, even in this unique 
subset of cases, courts do not universally favor the government.  For 
instance, the Supreme Court has ruled against the government in cases 
where the justifications for a drug testing program failed to outweigh its 
privacy intrusions,269 where a blood test incident to arrest was too 
invasive,270 and where the sanctity of the home outweighed the 
government’s interest in drunk driving enforcement.271  
In addition, overt balancing at the reasonableness stage may favor 
the government in some cases because of flaws in the Court’s 
reasonableness balancing approach, which is unrigorous and poorly 
defined.  It sometimes focuses on government interests writ large and 
compares them to the one-off harms imposed on the single defendant 
                                                 
262 Fabio Arcila Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless Searches in the 
Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223, 1227–31 (2004). 
263 Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 530−31 (1967). 
264 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338−39 (1985). 
265 Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665−66 (1989). 
266 See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656−57 (1995). 
267 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989). 
268 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). 
269 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997) (striking down a statute 
mandating drug testing of candidates for certain state officers);  
270 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184–85 (2016). See Winston v. 
Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (ruling in favor of the defendant in a 
reasonableness balancing case despite the presence of a warrant). 
271 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750–53 (1984). 
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challenging the seizure or search.272  This can create a sort of imbalancing 
test that favors the government by aggregating government interests 
while failing to do the same for citizens.273  But the far more concrete test 
developed above specifically directs courts to assess harms to citizens in 
the aggregate.274  The surveillance technique at issue is hypothesized to 
be widespread and its targets numerous, as frequently happens when 
surveillance goes unregulated by the Fourth Amendment.275  A more 
symmetrical balance should produce more symmetrical results. 
 
E. Positive Law Alternatives 
 
One model that courts have used when applying Katz looks to 
positive law to determine when people have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  In recent years, some scholars have suggested that courts should 
apply this model exclusively, basing the scope of the Fourth Amendment 
on what other sources of law permit or prohibit.276  The leading positive 
law proposal envisions a test in which the Fourth Amendment applies 
whenever a government officer’s investigative action would be a 
violation of law, a tort, or a use of the government’s unique legal 
authority.277  Although the positive law test offers some advantages, it has 
several flaws that render it undesirable as a determinant of the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope. 
A positive law approach would be more predictable than most other 
approaches, at least in the subset of cases where positive law is clear.  For 
instance, if a town had an ordinance prohibiting anyone but the licensed 
trash collecting company from collecting people’s trash, then the police 
would not be able to examine trash in that town without a warrant.278  
There will be numerous other cases, however, when government 
surveillance presents an issue that is unresolved in existing statutes or 
                                                 
272 Baradaran, supra note 260, at 15−21. 
273 Id. 
274 See supra text accompanying notes 75−76. 
275 See supra text accompanying notes 205−206. 
276 Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Decentralizing Fourth Amendment Search 
Doctrine, 107 Ky. L.J. __ (forthcoming 2019); Baude & Stern, supra note 4, at 
1831−32.  
277 Baude & Stern, supra note 4, at 1831−32.   
278 Id. at 1882. 
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precedents.  Many government surveillance practices, like the use of 
drug-sniffing dogs, arise rarely, if ever, in litigation between private 
parties.279  Even those that do arise in litigation commonly rest on open-
ended standards like “reasonableness,” which are often less developed in 
the context of privacy torts than they are in Fourth Amendment law.280  
In a variety of cases, a positive law test may simply move from a hard 
Fourth Amendment question to an even harder tort question.281  
Perhaps the most serious flaw in the positive law approach is the 
arbitrariness of its protections.  The Fourth Amendment would often rest 
on considerations that have nothing to do with citizens’ privacy, security, 
or freedom from government intrusion.282  Consider the trash collection 
example.  A person’s trash, which can reveal intimate details about 
activities inside their home, would be protected in a town where laws 
establish a local trash-collection monopoly, and entirely unprotected in a 
town without a monopoly.283  The protection of citizens’ privacy at home 
should not turn on such irrelevant details.  Likewise, it makes little 
difference whether the government monitors a citizen by attaching a GPS 
device to her car or by tracking the car with a lawfully operated drone.  
Yet the former would presumptively require a warrant, while the latter 
would be wholly unregulated by the Fourth Amendment.284  It is the 
                                                 
279  Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 320 (2016).  
280 See id. 
281 Id. 
282 Protecting citizens’ privacy against arbitrary government intrusion is a 
fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment.  Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“It is not the breaking of [a man’s] doors, and the 
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is 
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and 
private property . . . .”); CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS 
AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791, at 766 (“Privacy was the bedrock 
concern of the amendment, not general warrants.”); Morgan Cloud, Searching 
Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1726 (1996) 
(noting that “the historical record suggests that objections to general warrants 
and general searches alike rested upon broad concerns about protecting 
privacy, property, and liberty from unwarranted and unlimited intrusions”);  
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 547,  744–45 (1999) (arguing that “it is certainly the case that the Framers 
intended to preserve a personal and domestic sphere that would be 
meaningfully protected against undue intrusions by government officers”).   
283 Baude & Stern, supra note 4, at 1882. 
284 State laws may vary, but the Restatement Second of Torts § 217 suggests that 
 DRAFT - Forthcoming, 104 Minnesota L. Rev. (2019) 
55 
 
constant monitoring of individuals, not the de minimis touching of a car, 
that invades people’s privacy and raises concerns about government 
oppression.  But under a positive law test, only the touching matters. 
A positive law regime would have the benefits of increased 
legislative control over criminal procedure, such as institutional 
competence and comprehensiveness.285  But an enhanced legislative role 
would also have significant drawbacks in the Fourth Amendment 
context.  A regime that significantly relies on legislative action to address 
new surveillance questions would likely be systematically 
underprotective of privacy.286  The high and growing enactment costs of 
legislation and the preferences of entrenched interest groups result in a 
powerful bias in favor of legislative inaction.287  Law enforcement 
agencies are likely to use invasive surveillance technologies long before 
legislatures regulate them via statute.288   
A core function of the Fourth Amendment is to limit the ability of the 
political branches of government to compromise citizens’ privacy.289  The 
positive law approach would eliminate such limits so long as legislatures 
allow private parties as well as officials to engage in surveillance.290  
Under the positive law model, a determined government could permit its 
                                                 
touching a chattel without permission would be unlawful, even if the owner 
could not maintain an action for damages.  Laurent Sacharoff, Constitutional 
Trespass, 81 TENN. L. REV. 877, 906−07 (2014). 
285 John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. 
REV. 205, 232−34 (2015); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New 
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 
870, 875 (2004). 
286 This is especially the case for surveillance techniques that do not fit neatly 
into existing privacy tort categories, such as location tracking or the collection 
of communications metadata. 
287 FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, 
WHO LOSES, AND WHY 24–26, 45 (2009); Tokson, supra note 10, at 193. 
288 See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s 
Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 768–71 (2005). 
Likewise, statutes regulating evolving technologies tend to become obsolete 
quickly, and Congress has historically failed to amend such laws to 
accommodate technological change.  See id.  
289 See supra note 135.   
290 Re, supra note 279, at 330−31.  Re notes that citizens will often be unable or 
unwilling to engage in such surveillance, and thus often do not present a 
substantial barrier to privacy-eliminating laws.  Id. 
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officials to engage in any type of surveillance without judicial check.  
Relatedly, a positive law approach could result in law enforcement and 
national security interest groups lobbying for diminished protections 
against private surveillance.291  This would both increase the scope of 
permissible government monitoring and reduce existing protections 
against intrusions by private parties.   
Several other substantial objections to the positive law test have been 
raised.  Private intrusions and government investigations are very 
different, and the law has regulated them differently.292  Treating them as 
the same threatens to ignore the greater harms of government 
investigation in many cases and the greater justifications for government 
investigation in others.293  Depending on how it is applied, the positive 
law test might also produce absurd results, for instance finding a Fourth 
Amendment violation when a CDC researcher violates an FDA safety 
regulation while conducting a blood test.294  Significant problems also 
arise in cases involving data held by third parties.295  Ultimately, the 
fundamental arbitrariness and underprotectiveness of the positive law 
approach make it an unappealing alternative to the normative model.   
 
  
V. APPLYING THE NEW MODEL 
 
The normative approach requires courts to overtly examine the 
concrete benefits and harms of government surveillance.  This direct 
analysis will often clarify what the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
test obscures.  The normative approach can resolve novel cases more 
                                                 
291 Id. at 329. 
292 See id. at 321−24. 
293 See id. 
294 See Re, supra note 279, at 318. 
295 Under the leading positive law approach, for example, it is difficult to 
separate out uses of the government’s unique authority (which are searches) 
from informal government coercion (which is not).  See Re, supra note 279, at 
323.  The government’s ability to obtain information held by third parties, 
perhaps the central issue of modern Fourth Amendment law, would be largely 
determined by the efficacy of informal pressure to persuade 
telecommunications service providers to share data.  Tokson, supra note 10, at 
191 n. 307.   
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effectively and clearly than the Katz test, which struggles with new 
technologies and social practices.  It can also provide a better foundation 
for cases with sound outcomes but dubious rationales.  Finally, the 
normative model can reveal existing cases that are seriously flawed and 
ripe for reversal.   
 
A. Deciding Frontier Cases 
 
A primary virtue of the normative test is that it can resolve with 
relative ease many cases that are difficult to assess under the Katz regime.  
It decides cases involving new forms of surveillance effectively, without 
bogging down in a futile inquiry about societal expectations towards 
novel technologies.  Indeed, the Katz approach can leave Fourth 
Amendment protection for a new technology unresolved long after its 
adoption by the general public.  
Several decades after the popularization of email, the Supreme Court 
has yet to determine whether the contents of emails (or other text-based 
electronic communications) are protected by the Fourth Amendment.296  
Further, the leading appeals court case on emails declined to reach a 
definitive ruling, instead holding that protection for emails is dependent 
on the specifics of email service privacy policies and user agreements.297  
The Fourth Amendment would not apply, for example, to emails 
governed by a privacy policy that allows a service provider to inspect or 
monitor a user’s emails.298  This echoed a previous en banc decision, 
which stated that “the expectation[] of privacy that computer users have 
in their emails…assuredly shifts from internet-service agreement to 
internet-service agreement,” depending on the specific terms of each 
agreement.299   
Whether emails are protected under the Fourth Amendment remains 
                                                 
296 To be sure, dicta in Carpenter suggests that the Justices intuitively favor 
extending Fourth Amendment protection to emails.  But the Justices have not 
assessed email collection in any depth nor addressed the user agreements and 
electronic inspection issues that threaten to undermine Fourth Amendment 
protection for emails. 
297 United States v. Warshak (Warshak III), 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010). 
298 Id. at 287. 
299 Warshak v. United States (Warshak II), 532 F.3d 521, 526–27 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(en banc). 
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unresolved outside of the Sixth Circuit, and even in that circuit, it is 
unknown whether third-party email services that electronically inspect 
user emails strip those emails of Fourth Amendment protection.300  The 
normative test would resolve these open issues definitively.  The harms 
to individuals of widespread government inspection of the contents of 
emails are potentially enormous.  There would be a profound chilling 
effect on both the volume and the content of personal communications, 
especially intimate or controversial communications.  The scope and 
vigor of the ideas conveyed via email would decrease, political activism 
would be hampered, and personal relationships would be harmed and in 
some cases substantially diminished.    
At first glance, the law enforcement benefits of allowing the 
government to read every citizen’s emails might also seem substantial, 
albeit not great enough to outweigh the enormous costs.  But the benefits 
to law enforcement may be far less extensive than they initially appear.  
The vast majority of crimes—robberies, car thefts, drug crimes, murders, 
assaults, etc.—are unlikely to be discussed via email either before or after 
the crime.  The volume of intimate communications captured or chilled 
by government observations would be exponentially higher than the 
volume of emails remotely relevant to legitimate law enforcement.  
Moreover, there is an ironic benefit to law enforcement in confining email 
observation to those cases where the police have probable cause.  In a 
world where the police review virtually everyone’s emails, even 
unsophisticated criminals will avoid discussing their crimes via email or 
take care to securely encrypt their emails.  By contrast, the currently low 
probability that any given email will be read encourages criminals to 
occasionally use email in the course of their crimes.  The very difficulty 
of generating probable cause helps ensure that, when the police do have 
probable cause, they often find evidence.301  For all of these reasons, the 
normative test would universally protect citizens from the routine 
government inspection of personal communications, rather than leaving 
them unprotected or basing protection on the unread fine print of their 
software user agreements.   
                                                 
300 Dana T. Benedetti, How Far Can the Government’s Hand Reach Inside Your 
Personal Inbox?: Problems with the SCA, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY 
L. 75, 91 (2013). 
301 See Minzner, supra note 157, at 923−25.  
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A similar analysis could be performed for newer technologies such 
as smart homes and voice-controlled home speakers like the Amazon 
Alexa.  The chilling effects and psychological harms inflicted by 
government monitoring of in-home cameras and microphones would be 
massive.  The benefits to law enforcement would be dwarfed by such 
harms, and a substantial amount of criminal activity would simply be 
relocated to the basement or the back yard.   
 
B. Fixing Cases with Unsound Rationales  
 
Many cases decided under the Katz test are poorly reasoned, full of 
incoherent statements about societal expectations or unworkable 
standards that make a muddle of future cases.  Yet many of the same 
cases reach sound or at least defensible outcomes.  The normative test can 
provide a more coherent justification of these outcomes and avoid the 
perils of expectation-based rationales. 
  For example, the Court in United States v. Miller held that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to bank records such as checks and deposit 
slips relating to an individual’s bank account.302  The Court dubiously 
asserted that customers lose any expectation of privacy in their bank 
records because the records are voluntarily conveyed to the banks and 
are “exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”303  
This reasoning has been criticized extensively.304  But the outcome of 
Miller, as applied to account balances, checks, and deposit slips (and not 
to more revealing data like credit card purchase information) is 
defensible under the normative test, and is likely undeserving of reversal.  
To summarize, allowing the government to access bank records is 
unlikely to harm interpersonal relationships or intimate communications.  
There appears to be little in the psychological literature on harmful effects 
                                                 
302 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976). 
303 Id. at 442. 
304 E.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth 
Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 675 n. 247 
(2011) (noting that the Miller court might have been wrong in analyzing bank 
records as business records of the banks); Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth 
Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Privacy”, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 
1313−14 (1981). 
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of government scrutiny of one’s finances, although surveys indicate that 
people find it fairly invasive.305  The potential for substantial harm may 
be limited, however, as the information disclosed in one’s deposit slips, 
negotiable instruments, and account balances is unlikely to reveal 
drastically more than citizens already reveal to the government in the 
course of paying their taxes.  Government scrutiny of bank records may 
also chill certain legitimate activities in rare cases.  These might include 
the transfer of money to activist groups, foreign entities, or other lawful 
groups disfavored by the state.  These harms are non-trivial, albeit less 
profound than those at issue in cases involving email searches or searches 
of the home. Yet the criminal enforcement benefits of obtaining bank 
records are substantial and unique. As the Court briefly noted in Miller, 
bank records have a “high degree of usefulness in criminal tax, and 
regulatory investigations and proceedings.”306  White collar 
investigations are unique in that they typically lack physical evidence or 
neutral witnesses.307  A rule that law enforcement must have probable 
cause before accessing financial records “would end many white-collar 
criminal investigations before they had begun.”308  Thus a court could 
hold that subpoenaing bank records other than detailed credit card 
records is not a Fourth Amendment search, reasoning that such records 
are not especially sensitive and their benefits to law enforcement are 
extensive.  The normative test provides a basis for the holding of Miller 
that avoids the Court’s implausible claims about assumption of risk and 
its privacy-eroding conclusion that any sharing of information with a 
third party eliminates Fourth Amendment protection.309  
A similar rethinking could benefit cases like Kyllo v. United States, 
which held that the infrared scanning of a house was a Fourth 
Amendment search.310  Kyllo limited its holding to surveillance 
                                                 
305 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 118, 737−38, tbl. 1.  It was rated as more 
invasive than questioning someone on the sidewalk for ten minutes, but less 
invasive than searching a corporation’s computer.  Id.  The study did not 
examine the harms of such surveillance, if any.  
306 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1)). 
307 William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth 
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 859–60 (2001). 
308 Id.; see also Kerr, supra note 62, at 509. 
309 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442−43. 
310 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
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technologies that were not in “general public use,” as people would 
presumably have no expectation of privacy against a technology that was 
widely used to observe or record their activities.311  The normative test 
could resolve the issue without the ambiguous “general public use” 
limitation, on the basis that infrared scanning to detect activities 
occurring inside private homes could cause serious harms and chilling 
effects on a variety of private activities within the home, and the benefits 
of detecting mostly low-level drug crimes do not come close to justifying 
such an intrusion.312 
 
C. Identifying and Reversing Flawed Cases  
 
The normative approach can also identify existing cases that are 
especially flawed and ripe for reversal.  In California v. Greenwood, for 
instance, the Court held that opening citizens’ trash bags left on the curb 
and examining their trash is not a Fourth Amendment search.313  The 
Court reasoned that the defendants had no expectation of privacy 
because “it is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at 
the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, 
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public” and thus 
“respondents exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat 
their claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”314   
Although unsubstantiated claims about societal knowledge might 
support the Court’s holding, the normative test does not.  A homeowner’s 
trash is especially revealing of the activities that occur inside of a home, 
likely more revealing than the infrared heat scan in Kyllo.  If trash 
surveillance were to become widespread, the intimate activities of the 
home would be exposed to the observation and judgment of others.315  
                                                 
311 Id. 
312 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (noting that all activities occurring within the home 
are intimate activities). 
313 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). 
314 Id. 
315 Trash inspection has not yet become widespread, but the government could 
lawfully embark on a program to inspect every citizen’s trash at any time, 
without legal check.  As discussed above, previously unthinkable programs of 
surveillance often arise as the costs of information collection and processing 
decrease.  See supra note 206. 
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Such observation can lead to chilling effects or to significant 
psychological harm.316  Trash surveillance also threatens intimate 
relationships by exposing them to invasive scrutiny.  The sexual and 
other intimacies of a home are revealed in its trash, and the relationships 
involved may be deterred or diminished by outside observation.317   
Even the considerable law enforcement benefits of examining 
citizens’ trash are insufficient to justify such invasive surveillance.  In a 
world of pervasive trash inspection, criminals are less likely to throw 
away incriminating documents or evidence—the hassle of shredding or 
burning such evidence would be well worth avoiding imprisonment.318  
Even setting these dynamic effects aside, trash surveillance is likely to be 
most effective at detecting discarded drug paraphernalia, as in the 
Greenwood case.319  Not only may there be less value in pursuing low-level 
drug crimes, but police may be able to investigate more serious drug-
trafficking crimes by other means.  The police in Greenwood, for instance, 
may have had probable cause to search Greenwood’s house even without 
the trash inspection, having observed heavy vehicular traffic at night, cars 
visiting the house at night for only a few minutes, and a truck that drove 
from the house to a narcotics-trafficking location.320  The police might 
have also generated additional proof by pulling over the visiting cars 
based on reasonable suspicion of drug possession.321  In short, the 
normative test counsels in favor of overturning Greenwood, an especially 
egregious application of the Katz test that allows police to dig through 
any person’s trash without suspicion.  The normative approach would 
protect the intimate details of people’s activities inside their homes from 
arbitrary government scrutiny.  
The normative model might also spur a rethinking of Arizona v. 
Hicks, where a divided Court held that moving stereo equipment in order 
to view its serial number was a Fourth Amendment search.322  It is likely 
that the de minimis harm caused by such inspection is outweighed by the 
                                                 
316 See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 118, 737−38, tbl. 1; sources cited supra 
notes 79, 115.   
317 See Nissenbaum, supra note 99, at 138−39; Gerstein, supra note 97, at 268–69. 
318 See supra text accompanying note 301. 
319 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 38. 
320 Id. at 37. 
321 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985). 
322 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987). 
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potential benefits of deterring crime and recovering stolen property, such 
that no warrant should be required.   
Finally, the normative approach may counsel rejecting the emerging 
appeals court consensus that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that a user visits while surfing the 
internet.323  These addresses can reveal the content or at least the subject 
matter of the websites that a user visits.324  Such surveillance is likely to 
deter legitimate internet communications and research, potentially 
stunting intellectual development and exploration.325  Further, the 
evidence generated by such monitoring is likely to be weak and 
circumstantial, while evidence of internet-based crimes can likely be 
generated through less invasive means.326 
CONCLUSION 
 
Fourth Amendment law has undergone several dramatic shifts over 
the course of its history, as courts have struggled to preserve citizens’ 
privacy in the face of new surveillance practices and technologies.327 The 
Katz test was a particularly important shift.  It allowed courts to regulate 
non-physical surveillance practices by focusing on people’s “reasonable 
expectations of privacy,” rather than on property.328  But the test has been 
                                                 
323 United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 97−98 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. 
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008).  IP addresses are sequences of 
numbers assigned to each computer or other Internet-enabled device that is 
active on a network.   
324 Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2105, 2147−50 (2009).  
325 Marthews & Tucker, supra note 77; Richards, supra note 56, at 389, 421. 
326 For example, the police could obtain a warrant to capture the IP addresses 
that communicate with a website trafficking in child pornography or selling 
illegal goods. 
327  See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment is limited to tangible things); Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (declaring that the Fourth Amendment’s scope is not based 
on physical intrusion but is determined by expectations of privacy); United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s 
scope is also determined by trespass concepts); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 
1409 (2013) (abandoning the trespass concept for a concept based on physical 
touching and social norms). 
328 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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deeply flawed from the start, rightly criticized as incoherent, tautological, 
and arbitrary.  Increasingly, as knowledge of threats to privacy grows and 
an ever-greater proportion of our data is made accessible to third parties, 
societal expectations are unable to serve as an adequate foundation for 
the Fourth Amendment’s protections.   
The normative test offers a better approach to determining the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope.  It is both more consistent with the historical 
purposes of the Amendment and far more resilient to social and 
technological change.  Its factors capture the fundamental harms of 
government surveillance and are firmly grounded in precedent and 
pragmatic surveillance theory.  Further, its analysis is direct and 
transparent, avoiding false targets and arbitrary distinctions.  It is better 
able to address the widespread surveillance programs that increasingly 
pose the greatest threats to citizen security.   And it provides a superior 
method for deciding frontier cases and resolving controversies about 
existing decisions.    
The Supreme Court has been slow to adopt new Fourth Amendment 
paradigms in the past.  It took the Court nearly forty years to overrule 
Olmstead v. United States,329 which ruled that the Fourth Amendment did 
not apply to microphones or wiretaps.  During those decades, the 
government engaged in a massive program of bugging and wiretapping 
private citizens.330  It used these recordings to monitor and undermine 
political groups, intimidate members of Congress, and threaten civil 
rights leaders, among numerous other abuses.331  These abuses did not 
come to light until long after the damage had been done.332   
Fourth Amendment law is in need of another paradigm shift, one 
that will enable courts to protect privacy in a world of ever-changing and 
expanding surveillance technologies.  If history is any guide, the time for 
such a change is now.  The normative test, like any legal test, has both 
advantages and drawbacks.  But in the world of modern surveillance, it 
offers the best way forward for Fourth Amendment law. 
 
                                                 
329 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
330 See, e.g., Tokson, supra note 118, at 583. 
331 Id. 
332 See 2 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 183-85, 198−201 (GPO 1976).  
